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ENFORCEMENT TO AN 
EXPANDING CLEAN WATER ACT: 
THE SAN FRANCISCO BAYKEEPER 
MODEL 
BY MICHAEL R. LOZEAU* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On October 22, 1997, the Federal Clean Water Act turned 
twenty-five years old. Like most twenty-five-year-olds, the Act 
is now beginning to hit its stride. In its first two decades, the 
Act focused almost exclusively on larger, more obvious "point 
sources" of water pollution. 1 The Act's coverage included every 
sewage plant in the country, raising the quality of treatment of 
* Mr. Lozeau is the Executive Director and General Counsel of San Francisco 
BayKeeper, based in San Francisco, California. Since 1991, Mr. Lozeau has been a sole 
practitioner attorney working exclusively for non-profit and tribal clients on environ-
mental litigation and regulatory matters. From 1989 through 1991, Mr. Lozeau was an 
associate attorney in the San Francisco office of Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund (for-
merly Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund). Mr. Lozeau graduated with honors from Rut-
gers University School of Law in Newark, New Jersey, in 1989. Mr. Lozeau has repre-
sented BayKeeper since 1990. 
1. "Point source" is dermed by the Act as follows: "The term "point source" means 
any discernible, confmed and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any 
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, 
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988). 
429 
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our communities' municipal sewage from largely "primary" 
treatment, involving simple screening technologies, to "secon-
dary" and "tertiary" treatment, involving active biological 
treatment of sewage. To a large extent, that nationwide up-
grade has controlled many previous existing health and envi-
ronmental threats posed by large quantities of concentrated 
human waste. Similarly, throughout those two decades, waste 
discharges from industrial operations have at least been regu-
lated, albeit, given the diversity and complexity of many of the 
pollutants discharged by industrial sources both directly to the 
nation's waters and through our sewage plants, the risks posed 
by many discharged contaminants is only now beginning to be 
understood and controlled through the permitting process. 
Simply put, most of the gross, more obvious sources of con-
tamination have been brought within the Act's purview, regu-
lated through the Act's permitting program, and brought under 
some measure of control. Massive amounts of sewage have 
been removed from our waters. Significant sources of indus-
trial contaminants have been reduced. 
Despite those efforts and their accompanying successes, all 
indications are that our nation's waters continue to decline in 
quality and ecosystems remain on the verge of collapse based 
in part on impaired water quality.2 As it turns out, the obvious 
pollution is only a part - granted a significant part even today 
- of the problem. Having put in place a system for regulating 
the obvious, the Act, as a young adult, has now begun to turn 
its attention to more difficult challenges. These challenges in-
clude more "exotic" and previously under-recognized water con-
taminants, like selenium discharges from oil refmeries and 
aerial deposition of very dangerous contaminants, such as di-
oxin from incinerator smokestacks.3 Perhaps the most far-
2. The San Francisco Bay and its Delta are a case in point with observable in-
creases in a number of highly toxic pollutants, including pesticides and heavy metals. 
See SAN FRANCISCO ESTUARY PROJECT, STATE OF THE ESTUARY 1992-1997, 41-44 
(1997). 
3. See, e.g., KiM TAYLOR, PLANNING AND POLICY UNIT, SAN FRANCISCO BAY 
. REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD, SELENIUM IN THE BAY ENVIRONMENT - AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS, REGULATORY HISTORY, AND CURRENT 
STATUS (May 21, 1997); Staff Summary Report, San Francisco Regional Water Quality 
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reaching, in terms of a general source of a significant percent-
age of the pollution reaching our waters and the size of the 
regulated community, is storm water pollution. 
This article focuses on the Act's storm water pollution con-
trol program as it is being implemented in California. In par-
ticular, the article focuses on that aspect of the storm water 
regulations where the rubber meets the road - the enforce-
ment arena - and on the ever more important role of citizen 
enforcers as the Act reaches out to pollution problems that call 
on pollution control and prevention actions by tens of thou-
sands of industrial and municipal facilities in California, and 
hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of facilities nation-
wide. The article includes three case studies demonstrating 
how citizen enforcement actions can be effective. Each of the 
case studies involves actions brought by the non-profit organi-
zation San Francisco BayKeeper and its upstream Stockton-
based project, DeltaKeeper.4 
The three case studies are organized based on the financial, 
rather than the physical size, of a number of representative 
dischargers. It perhaps goes without saying that the financial 
capabilities of a permittee under the Act matter. As the Act 
evolves to address storm water as well as other less centralized 
sources of water pollution, many smaller businesses that previ-
ously had no experience with the Act's requirements, are com-
ing within its mandate. As enforcement efforts have begun to 
bring these more numerous and smaller dischargers into com-
pliance with the Act, inequities become apparent between the 
enforcement burden placed on the economically largest viola-
tors and that placed on smaller businesses. For the economi-
cally larger violator, the burden tends to be too small and pro-
Control Board !hereinafter "SFRWQCB"l, Workshop on Dioxin and Dioxin-like Com-
pounds (May 7,1997). 
4. Other groups involved in the described actions include, most importantly, 
Communities For A Better Environment !hereinafter "CBE"l, who are the lead plain-
tiffs in the case against Union Oil Company. In addition, The Bay Institute, Save San 
Francisco Bay Ass'n, and S. Anglers For Environmental Rights !hereinafter "SAFER"l 
are plaintiffs with CBE and BayKeeper on the Union Oil case. The Petaluma River 
Council brought several of the junkyard cases with BayKeeper in the northern part of 
San Francisco Bay. 
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vides the largest companies an incentive to litigate rather than 
comply. The enforcement burdens placed on the smallest dis-
chargers is relatively much greater where, in many cases, a 
small shop cannot afford to engage in federal court litigation 
and still be expected to pay for necessary compliance measures 
and an appropriate civil penalty. Based upon the three repre-
sentative case studies, this article concludes with specific leg-
islative recommendations to fine tune the Act's enforcement 
provisions to better reflect the full range of pollution issues and 
facilities now being addressed by the Act, twenty-five years 
into its important life. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT: THE 
EARLY YEARS 
A. BIRTH 
The modern Clean Water Act was not born of subtlety. It 
was born of catastrophic pollution, visibly stifling vast ecosys-
tems.5 The Act's political conception began on January 28, 
1969, when almost three million gallons of crude oil began 
surging from an oil drilling platform in the Santa Barbara 
Channel operated by the Union Oil Co.6 The oil which washed 
5. See H.R. REP. No. 91-127 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 2691 (H.R. 
4148, Water and Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970). The House Report 
for the 1970 amendments, which was the first statute authorizing federal preemption 
of water pollution control, albeit limited to oil and hazardous substances, observes that 
"[elvents of catastrophic proportions have confronted us with dramatic evidence of the 
need for new or better preventive or control laws and procedures." [d. Two years 
later, that sentiment led directly to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amend-
ments of 1972, creating the modern Clean Water Act. 
6. The very first amendments to the prior water pollution control acts occurred in 
1970, just a few months after the Santa Barbara oil spill. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-127 
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CAN. 2691, 2692 (Pub. L. No. 91-224). Those amend-
ments, which later were carried forward in the major revisions of 1972, dealt specifi-
cally with oil pollution and hazardous substance discharges. See id. As the committee 
report explains: 
Devastation of California's beaches 2 months ago by oil from an offshore 
drilling rig made the lesson loud and clear. It may not even be possible 
to assess the vast damage to marine life and recreation. This commit-
tee made an on-the-site investigation at Santa Barbara and found the 
physical situation appalling. 
[d. at 2692. 
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onto the previously immaculate beaches of Santa Monica for 
months after the spill persisted on the beaches and in the 
minds of the entire country. In August 1969, after a speech in 
Santa Barbara, one of the sole political standard bearers for 
environmental issues at the time, Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-
Wis), moved by the catastrophic oil spill and another tragedy of 
the day, the Vietnam War, conceived of the idea of Earth Day.7 
Grafting a strategy of teach-ins, then popular on college cam-
puses to educate people into action responding to the War, onto 
the pressing environmental concerns underscored by the Santa 
Barbara oil spill, Senator Nelson put in motion what would be 
the largest demonstration in United States history.8 Twenty 
million participants throughout the country gathered for the 
first Earth Day on April 22, 1970.9 . 
The Clean Water Act was born on October 18, 1972.10 The 
Act was the fourth statute in a cascade of environmental laws 
- including the National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Air 
Act, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act - that were 
enacted in the wake of Earth Day.11 Concrete problems de-
See also MARc MOWREY & TIM REDMOND, NOT IN OUR BACKYARD - THE PEOPLE AND 
EVENTS THAT SHAPED AMERICA'S MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 15-19 (William 
Morrow & Co. 1993). 
7. See MOWREY, supra note 6, at 29-30. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. For an account of the f!Tst Earth Day in 1970, see MOWREY, supra note 
6, at 39-43. 
10. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA or Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 
92-500, 92d Congo (1972), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1988). A direct link between the 
Santa Barbara spill and the FWPCA is described in the 1970 amendments to the then 
existing federal water laws which focused on oil pollution and hazardous substances in 
coastal waters. See former 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970) (superseded by Pub. L. No. 92-500 
(1972». See FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 3-81 (1997). That 
initial response to the Santa Barbara spill was readopted in the 1972 amendments. 
See Clean Water Act § 311(oX2), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(oX2). 
11. The first statute of the modem environmental law movement - the National 
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") - actually was enacted shortly after the Santa 
Barbara spill on January 1, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. After 
Earth Day, major areas of environmental concern rapidly were brought within the 
ambit of federal law, starting with the modem Clean Air Act, Pub. L. 91-604, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7401 et seq., enacted on December 31, 1970, and followed by the Resources Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act, and then the FWPCA. For the congressional session following 
Earth Day, the 91st Congress, it has been estimated that 4000 environmental bills 
were introduced. See also S. REP. No. 92-414 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N., 
3668,3670-71, explaining that "the committee's goal is a policy for the adequate man-
agement of all forms of environmental pollution and for effective protection of the 
5
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served concrete law. Up until the Clean Water Act's enact-
ment, federal water quality law relied exclusively on the devel-
opment by individual states of ambient water quality stan-
. dards without any effective process to translate the relative 
contribution of any individual pollution source.12 In order to 
address any significant source, a state would have to prove that 
the facility caused a violation of a water quality standard 
through a complicated administrative and legal process.13 Con-
fronted with water pollution incidents of such significant mag-
nitude, like the Cuyahoga River fire, prevention of which was 
entirely stymied by the pre-1972 Act's unduly burdensome en-
forcement process, Congress enacted a regulatory system that 
focused on controlling pollution at the point where it left the 
polluting facility rather than waiting for it, along with the 
state's enforcement authority, to be diluted in the receiving 
waters.14 
The result was the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System ("NPDES").15 The system's basic components in-
cluded the continuation of the individual states promulgating 
water quality standards though more closely reviewed by the 
recently created Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").16 
The truly significant development was the establishment of a 
permitting system which refocused individual pollution dis-
environment." The modern Endangered Species Act was enacted shortly thereafter in 
December, 1973. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, 16 § U.S.C. 1531 et 
seq. 
12. The Senate Committee on Public Works Report prepared for Senate Bill 2770, 
which later became the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, provides an ex-
cellent summary of the prior federal water quality laws which led up to that Act. See 
S. REP. No. 92-414 (1972), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669. The Report describes 
the inadequacy of enforcement at that time: "The continued use of the 1948 abatement 
procedure also contributes to delay. The record shows an almost total lack of enforce-
ment. Under this procedure, only one case has reached the courts in more than two 
decades." Id. at 3669-73. Most of the permitting and enforcement provisions in the 
1972 amendments focused on rectifYing the impracticalities of that previous law. See 
SHELDONM. NOVICK, LAw OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 12.01(3) (1987). 
13. See NOVICK, supra note 12, at § 12.01(1), n. 3. Prior law provided for a compli-
cated "abatement conference" procedure. See id. See also S. REP. No. 92-414 (1972), 
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672. See NOVICK, supra note 12, at§ 12.01(5) 
for a description of the inefficiency of the older scheme. 
14. See GRAD, supra note 10, at 3-78 -3-80. 
15. See Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988). 
16. See Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
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chargers' responsibilities not only on the achievement of water 
quality standards applicable to the receiving waters into which 
they discharged, but also on complying with specific technol-
ogy-based numerical and narrative eftluent limitations con-
tained in a binding permitP To eliminate any doubt about 
dischargers' responsibilities under the new Act, Congress made 
dischargers strictly liable for compliance with the new per-
mits.18 
Because the Act largely was responding to obvious water 
pollution problems and needed a specific point at which com-
pliance could be measured in order to effectively implement the 
NPDES permitting program, it originally limited its scope to 
regulating discharges from "point sources."19 In addition to 
providing for a clear compliance point, the Act's effort to con-
fine its jurisdiction to such point sources also was derived from 
a concern for EPA's and the states' anticipated burden for initi-
ating the permitting program, a concern that was to hold true 
for the first years of the Act's existence. 
17. See Pub. L. No. 92-500, §§ 301, 402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342. See S. REP. No. 
92-474, at 11 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3675. See EPA v. California 
ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 202-09 (1976). See also 
Michael Lozeau, Preliminary Injunctions and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: 
The Clean Water Permit Program as a Limitation on the Courts' Equitable Discretion, 
42 RUTGERS L. REV. 701, 726-33 (1990). 
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) provides in relevant part: "The discharge of any pollutant 
by any person shall be unlawful." Id. See Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 813 F.2d 1480, 
1491-92 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 485 U.S. 931, reinstated, 853 F.2d 
667 (1988) (explaining Congress's intent to avoid complicated factual inquiries). See 
also Lozeau, supra note 17, at 731, n. 172 (citing numerous cases holding that liability 
under the Clean Water Act is strict). 
19. As the United States Supreme Court explained: 
Such direct restrictions on discharges facilitate enforcement by making 
it unnecessary to work backward from an overpolluted body of water to 
determine which point sources are responsible and which must be 
abated. In addition, a discharger's performance is now measured 
against strict technology-based effluent limitations - specified levels of 
treatment - to which it must conform, rather than against limitations 
derived from water quality standards to which it and other polluters 
must collectively conform. 
Environmental Protection Agency v. California, 426 U.S. at 204-05 (footnotes omit-
ted). See also S. REP. No. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3675. 
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B. INFANCY 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, most commonly 
referred to as "The Clean Water Act," mandated that all per-
mits be issued by December 31, 1974.20 Until a permit was 
issued, a discharger was deemed to be in compliance, provided 
the discharger had applied for a permit within 180 days of the 
Act's enactment.21 The Act further provided that technology-
based effiuent limitations based on the "best practicable control 
technology currently available" ("BPT") was to be achieved by 
industrial dischargers from "point sources" by July 1, 1977.22 
Prior to that date, the initial permits could provide for less 
stringent discharge controls, including compliance schedules to 
achieve BPT by the July, 1977, deadline.23 Compliance with 
even more stringent technology-based limitations, the "best 
available technology economically achievable" ("BAT"), was 
required to be achieved by the original 1972 amendments as of 
July 1, 1983.24 
Despite the statutory deadlines, first round permits were 
issued by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") from 
about 1972 through 1977.25 Those first round permits focused 
on pollutants for which the agency felt it had sufficient techni-
cal knowledge, for example, total suspended solids, pH, biologi-
cal oxygen demand ("BOD"), chemical oxygen demand ("COD"), 
oil and grease, heat, phenols, arsenic, cyanide, metals (includ-
ing mercury, zinc, chromium, iron, aluminum, copper and 
nickel), and some organic compounds related to pesticide 
20. See Clean Water Act, § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1988). See Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977). 
21. See Clean Water Act, § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k); Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
22. See Clean Water Act, § 301(b)(I)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 131l(b)(I)(A). See Bethlehem 
Steel, 544 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1976) (EPA is without authority to grant an extension of 
the July 1, 1977, deadline). 
23. See Clean Water Act, § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k); Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
24. See Clean Water Act, § 301(b)(2), 33 U.S.C § 13U(b)(2). Congress extended 
those deadlines in amendments to the Act passed in 1977. The deadlines for achieving 
both BAT and BPT were extended. 
25. See NOVICK, supra note 12, at § 12.05(2)[a), n. 35. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss3/7
1998] SAN FRANCISCO BAYKEEPER MODEL 437 
manufacturing.26 Thus, "exotic" pollutants were largely ig-
nored in those initial permits. For each of those reasonably 
well-understood pollutants, EPA developed nationwide effiuent 
limitations applying to whole categories of industry. The ini-
tial industrial categories addressed by EPA were limited to 
twenty-seven categories specified by Congress in the 1972 
amendments.27 The resulting single number effiuent limita-
tions were published in EPA national effiuent guidelines which 
were, in turn, relied upon by the various permit writers. 
In addition to the technology-based effiuent limitations, the 
other prominent feature of the Clean Water Act and other envi-
ronmental laws enacted in the wake of Earth Day and the 
Santa Barbara Channel oil spill was the inclusion of a citizen 
suit enforcement provision.28 The Clean Water Act's citizen 
enforcement provision, as well as its principle predecessor in 
the Clean Air Act, grew out of eighty years of citizen investiga-
tions, rewards and attempts at private attorney enforcement 
under the Rivers and Harbors Act.29 The provisions also were 
directly influenced by the Michigan Environmental Protection 
Act of 1970,30 which was enacted on October 1, 1970, and was 
authored by Professor Joseph Sax, then of Michigan Law 
Schoo1.31 This article will not attempt to review the mecha-
nisms and evolution of citizen enforcement under the Clean 
Water Act, as a number of excellent overviews already exist. 
Suffice it to say that citizens have been authorized to bring en-
forcement actions for violations of the Act, and their efforts 
constitute a critical component of the overall enforcement of 
the Clean Water Act. 
26. See id. at § 12.05[3][a][ii][A). See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 
U.S. 112 (1977). 
27. See Clean Water Act, § 306(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A) (1988); NRDC v. 
Train, 510 F.2d at 704-06. 
28. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365. 
29. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control 
Laws (Part I) 13 Envt'l L. Rep. (Envt'l L. Inst.) 10309, 10309, n. 2. (1993) 
30. Act 127, PA 1970, MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. §§ 629.1201 et seq. (West 1987). 
31. See The Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970: Roberts v. Michigan: 
A Test Case, 1 Envt'l Law Rep. (Envt'! L. Inst.) 10013 (1971). 
9
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The only citizen suits brought during the Act's infancy were 
brought by national environmental organizations, such as the 
Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"), against EPA 
focusing on development of the Act's various components, in-
cluding, for example, the promulgation of effiuent limitation 
guidelines32 and criteria for state permitting programs. Obvi-
ously, no enforcement against dischargers was contemplated by 
the Act until at least July 1, 1977, the deadline for compliance 
with the first level of technology-based standards, i.e., BPI'. 
Even as that deadline approached, EPA issued a policy memo-
randum acknowledging its belief that, in many instances, de-
spite good faith efforts by various companies, it would not be 
feasible for them to comply with the 1977 BPI' deadline, and 
that in those instances, the agency would apply its prosecuto-
rial discretion and issue an Enforcement Compliance Schedule 
Letter ("ESCL") attempting to provide the company with more 
time to comply.33 
In addition to technical and resource constraints in getting 
the NPDES up and running, aggressive enforcement likely was 
confounded by the continued presence of managers and con-
sultants who had gained their experience and expertise 
through implementation of the previous grant-based programs 
which did not rely on a command and control system or vigor-
ous enforcement proceedings. Prior to 1972, the federal role in 
regulating water quality focused primarily on grant programs 
administering funds to states, and ultimately individual mu-
nicipalities, to assist in funding the construction of sewage 
treatment facilities.34 The construction grants program in 
many states conditioned funding for cities and towns on using 
32. See NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. App. 1974). 
33. See BNA Environment Reporter 241-42 (June 11, 1976); Bethlehem Steel, 544 
F.2d. at 660. Interestingly, in discussing the import of EPA's policy on the mootness of 
that case, the Third Circuit noted the important role of citizen suits under the Act and 
the non-binding nature of the policy on citizen enforcers. Thus, even in the first in-
stance under the Act where EPA's judgment sought to downplay the need for enforce-
ment, the citizen suit provision acted as an important check on such discretionary 
decisions. See id. 
34. See NOVICK, supra note 12, at § 12.01[11, n. 2. In addition, the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Administration had some authority to publish guidance information 
on stream classifications and the development by states of effiuent limitations. See id .. 
10
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certain approved consulting engineers.3S That common feature 
gave rise to a tight knit community of consulting engineers and 
state water pollution grant managers which greatly affected 
implementation of the new Clean Water Act when it was 
amended in 1972.36 Many of the consulting engineers went to 
work for industry in preparing applications under the new 
NPDES permitting program. As the grant managers rose in 
the ranks of the agencies, although their mandate changed 
considerably in 1972, their individual outlooks tended toward 
engineered solutions and de-emphasized the importance of en-
forcement and penalties for noncompliance.37 
Thus, in general, for a number of years, the Act focused on 
the largest industries and municipal sewage plants. In doing 
so, perhaps for good reason, the agencies at the time largely 
ignored any exotic contaminants, focusing their limited re-
sources on the best known pollution parameters. Similarly, 
enforcement under the new regulatory scheme was approached 
hesitantly, given EPA's struggle to keep up with the permitting 
and effiuent limitation deadlines established by Congress in 
the 1972 Act and the important role played by managers of the 
previous grant-based program and their close association with 
consulting engineers relied on by that program, many of whom 
went over to working for industry after 1972. 
C. CHILDHOOD 
Throughout the 1970's and into the early 1980's, the almost 
exclusive use of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision 
was to challenge EPA decisions or omissions.38 Many of the 
cases were brought by national environmental organizations 
35. See id. at § 12.01(2)[a). 
36. See id. 
37. See id. 
38. See Miller (Part I), supra note 29, at 10313. Writing in 1983, having departed 
as the head of EPA's enforcement department, Mr. Miller observed at the time: "While 
the citizen suit was conceived and designed to allow private enforcement of the law 
against polluting violators, its most celebrated uses have been against EPA for its 
failures to implement the environmental statutes in a timely and complete manner." 
[d. 
11
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with a program-wide perspective.39 In the early 1980's, that 
focus began to change. 
One of the main reasons for this change was the election of 
President Ronald Reagan and the resulting precipitous decline 
in enforcement by EPA.40 The decline in federal enforcement 
started even before Reagan took office. In 1983, EPA only filed 
twenty-three enforcement cases under the Clean Water Act 
throughout the entire country.41 During the same period, two 
non-profit organizations - the Natural Resources Defense 
Council ("NRDC") and the New Jersey Public Interest Research 
Group ("NJPIRG") - filed eighteen citizen enforcement ac-
tions.42 Likewise, in 1983, it was estimated that EPA was re-
ceiving roughly seventy-five notices of intent to sue per year 
from citizens, a vast majority of which were addressing illegal 
discharges by violators, as compared to the roughly twenty-four 
notices per year prior to that time, most of which had been fo-
cused on EPA transgressions.43 According to Jeffrey Miller, 
who spent much of the 1970's as an EPA official, including 
serving as the head of its enforcement program, by the end of 
1983, citizen suits took their place as "the dominantly used 
federal judicial enforcement mechanism."44 The initial wave of 
citizen enforcement under the Clean Water Act was, thus, in 
the form of a rebellion against observed and anticipated ob-
struction and politicization of EPA's enforcement powers. With 
that rebellion at the end of the Act's first decade, the Act en-
tered its teen years. 
D. TEENAGE YEARS 
The trend observed by Miller continued into the mid- and 
late 1980's, with NRDC establishing a nationwide project -
the Enforcement Project, NJPIRG filing many cases in New 
Jersey alone and other groups picking up the baton, other 
PIRGs including many cases filed by the Sierra Club, Citizens 
39. See id. 
40. See id. at 10313, n. 37. 
41. See id. 
42. See Miller (Part I), supra note 29, at 10313, n. 37. 
43. See id. at 10314 n. 38. 
44. [d. at 10314. 
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,For A Better Environment in California and Illinois, Atlantic 
States Legal Foundation (" ASLF"), Hudson River Fishermen's 
Association, and Trustees For Alaska, among others.45 Almost 
all of these cases involved clearly written permits with specific 
numeric effiuent limitations applicable to sizable corporate dis-
chargers.46 Thus, the citizen enforcement cases of that period 
remained driven by the original purposes of the Act - which 
was to address the more obvious point sources and better un-
derstood pollutants. This is not to suggest that there was any-
thing wrong with that priority. Indeed, there was no other way 
to start in order to address the recognized problems at the time 
or to secure better results because the economic capabilities for 
the larger point sources were that much greater and the sim-
plicity of the permits made for a string of citizen victories that 
is unprecedented in the history of private litigation.47 
The Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield v. 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation epitomized the tone of citizen en-
forcement throughout this "rebellious" period.48 Certainly at 
the federal level, there was no reason to anticipate that EPA, 
controlled by an anti-environmental administration, would be 
anything but hostile to citizen enforcement. This tone was car-
ried down to the state level, triggered by the challenge to pre-
45. It is difficult to calculate exactly how many citizen enforcement actions were 
initiated during the 1980's because EPA, for many years, did not maintain a complete 
file of notices received by private groups. See Miller (Part I), supra note 29, at 10314, 
n. 38. Nevertheless, as of February, 1987, Frank Thomas, in an article published in 
the Environmental Law Reporter, cited no less than 35 published decisions involving 
separate citizen suits filed by private organizations. See Frank M. Thomas, Jr., Citizen 
Suits and the NPDES Program: A Review of Clean Water Act Decisions, 17 Envt'l L. 
Rep. 10050-10055 (Feb. 1987). 
46. See, e.g., Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Monsanto 
Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (D.N.J. 1985) (M[tlhe plaintiffs' argument in support of its 
motion [partial summary judgment on liability for violations of the Actl is a very basic 
one"); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Yates Industries Inc., 757 F. 
Supp. 438, 444-453 (D. N.J. 1991). 
47. See Thomas, supra note 45, at 10050 et seq. Groups bringing successful citi-
zen enforcement suits included NRDC, NJPIRG, and the Sierra Club. 
48. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 
(1987). In Gwaltney, the United States Supreme Court held that citizens were limited 
to bringing enforcement actions under Section 505 of the Act that seek prospective 
relief. The standard enunciated by the Court required citizen plaintiffs to allege and 
ultimately prove that a reasonable likelihood of continued or intermittent violations by 
the defendant existed at the time of filing the complaint. See id. at 57. 
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empt citizen actions laid down by the Gwaltney decision it-
self.49 
During this time, the grassroots environmental groups be-
gan to permeate the field of citizen enforcement, expanding 
their programs into areas that once were the sole concern of 
national groups, especially NRDC. NJPIRG demonstrated the 
accessibility of the Clean Water Act's enforcement provisions to 
a regional group and demonstrated the viability of making en-
forcement a primary part of its regional agenda. Although 
most of the citizen suits of that time were still brought by 
groups staking out a national scope, such as NRDC and ASLF, 
regional groups' roles were growing.50 Indeed, as the Act 
reached its young adulthood, national enforcement efforts have 
largely become a thing of the past. NRDC's Enforcement Proj-
ect was disbanded while actions brought by local regional 
groups have continued to grow and take important places in 
particular watersheds and state agency jurisdictions, perhaps 
best exemplified by the expansion of Keeper programs on wa-
tersheds throughout the country, each including as a mainstay 
49. It is fair to say that the tone established by the Gwaltney decision was one of 
general suspicion towards citizen enforcement efforts. The Court in effect found that 
citizens could not be trusted with the initiation of enforcement proceedings for wholly 
past violations, a task with which only the good reason of the federal and state gov-
ernments should entrusted. Looking back, one can see that Gwaltney was the fIrst 
major court decision which began a trend toward restricting citizen enforcement ac-
tions on a number of fronts, including in addition to prospective relief, ever higher 
hurdles to establish standing (see Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. 
Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 1997 WL 434864 (3d Cir. 1997», ever more detailed speci-
fIcity in notice letters, and ever more care in evaluating the potentially preemptive 
actions of local state agencies (see Communities For A Better Environment, et al. v. 
Union Oil Co., 861 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Cal. 1994), af/'d 83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, 177 S. Ct. 789 (1997». See infra Part V.B.3. for a detailed discussion of 
the Union Oil case. Unfortunately, many of the hurdles established are procedural in 
nature and focus the courts' attention on the actions of the plaintiff citizen groups and 
the timing of their efforts rather than the pollution problems the cases seek to have 
addressed. Nevertheless, much of these restrictions have been overcome by the expan-
sion of the Act to address previously ignored pollutant problems and adjustments made 
by the groups engaged in enforcement activities to avoid procedural pitfalls. 
50. During that time, NRDC frequently teamed up with regional organizations in-
cluding, for example, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Connecticut Fund For the Envi-
ronment and others. Thus, although regional groups were involved in many of the 
enforcement cases, the litigation strategy was driven by the availability of the national 
group's agenda. 
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of its program an enforcement agenda firmly imbedded in its 
local political and ecological climate.51 
III. THE ACT COMES OF AGE: FROM POINT TO "NON-
POINT" SOURCE REGULATION 
The Clean Water Act is perhaps most notable for the degree 
of forward thinking which Congress exhibited in the language 
adopted in 1972. It is indeed remarkable how little the frame-
work of the Act has had to adjust since that time. Several 
deadlines have had to be extended, but Congress, from the be-
ginning, saw clearly past the initial permitting phase and an-
ticipated that its water quality goals likely would not be solved 
once the major industrial and municipal point sources were 
permitted. The Act included provisions anticipating that water 
quality standards would still be violated even after BAT was 
being achieved throughout a watershed. In that event, the Act 
provided for additional measures to be required of dischargers 
- beyond BAT.52 These requirements would be driven by wa-
ter quality based effiuent limitations, going beyond the pre-
existing technology.53 The Act also anticipated the contribu-
tion of pollution from non-point sources and devised procedures 
to determine and address both point and non-point source pol-
lution on impaired water bodies through a waste load alloca-
tion and total maximum daily load process.54 
Most relevant to this article, Congress responded to those 
point sources which were more difficult for EPA and the states 
to focus their resources on - in particular, the multitude of 
industrial and municipal facilities contributing pollutants 
51. Hudson RiverKeeper was the first Keeper program in the country, established 
by the Hudson River Fishermen's Association in 1984. J. CRONIN & ROBERT F. 
KENNEDY, JR., THE RIVERKEEPERS (Scribner 1997). Beginning that year and continu-
ing to the present day, the Hudson RiverKeeper has maintained a steady docket of 
citizen enforcement cases based exclusively on pollution of the watershed of the Hud-
son River. The continuing vitality of RiverKeeper's watershed-based enforcement 
effort underscores the ability of a regional-based enforcement program to maintain its 
enforcement capabilities despite changes in the law or judicial decisions. 
52. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 13U(b)(I)(C), 1312 (1988). 
53. See id. 
54. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). 
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through their discharges of contaminated storm water.55 In 
this instant, Congress recognized that the Act's requirements 
already encompassed this important pollution source but that 
EPA and the states were unprepared to expend the resources 
necessary to apply the NPDES permitting program as it had 
been applied to the more "traditional" point sources. In 1987, 
Congress thus sought to streamline this aspect of the permit-
ting program, allowing the agencies to cut some corners in 
hopes that they could regulate the perhaps hundreds of thou-
sands of storm water dischargers without bankrupting their 
budgets. As will be discussed further below, Congress has not, 
however, adequately reflected on the enforcement burdens 
posed by the storm water program and the necessary evolution 
of those mechanisms to keep pace with the evolving regulatory 
mandate. 
IV. STORM WATER POLLUTION 
It is certainly no mystery that significant quantities of pol-
lution enter our waterways by way of storm water flows. In 
her seminal work, Silent Spring, biologist Rachel Carson de-
scribed one incident of storm water contamination which oc-
curred in the Colorado River downstream of Austin, Texas, in 
1961, where nearly every fish in that stretch was killed.56 Ms. 
Carson described the source of the massive fish kill as a dec-
ade-old practice of dumping or allowing various insecticides to 
be washed into Austin's storm sewers.57 As she wrote in 1962: 
The manager of [one] plant admitted that quantities of 
powdered insecticide had been washed into the storm 
sewer recently and, more significantly, he acknowledged 
that such disposal of insecticide spillage and residues 
had been common practice for the past 10 years. 
55. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p). 
56. See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 144-46 (Houghton-Mifflin 3d Prtg 1962). 
Roughly one thousand pounds of dead fish were observed per mile of riverbank. See id. 
at 145-46. 
57. See id. at 145. 
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On searching further, the fishery officers found other 
plants where rains or ordinary clean-up waters would 
carry insecticides into the sewer. The fact that provided 
the final link in the chain, however, was the discovery 
that a few days before the water in lake and river be-
came lethal to fish the entire storm-sewer system had 
been flushed out with several million gallons of water 
under high pressure to clear it of debris. This flushing 
had undoubtedly released insecticides lodged in the ac-
cumulation of gravel, sand, and rubble and carried them 
into the lake and thence to the river, where chemical 
tests later established their presence.58 
Despite that obvious pollution source, EPA opted not to ad-
dress pollution from storm sewers for many years, with the ex-
ception of sewage, and placed storm sewers generally outside 
the scope of the NPDES program.59 
Twenty-five years after Ms. Carson's observation, Congress 
found it necessary to amend the Clean Water Act to clarify a 
process to bring storm water discharges, including municipal 
storm water systems, under the NPDES permitting program.60 
Although a vast majority of storm water discharges from indus-
trial facilities, and certainly from any municipal storm sewer 
system, occur through "point sources," the sheer number of 
such pipes and conduits, the vast number of contributors of 
pollution to those systems, and the perceived difficulties of con-
trolling storm water flows led to hesitation by EPA and the 
State agencies. In 1987, Congress amended the Act to estab-
lish a framework for EPA and the States to regulate the quality 
of municipal and industrial storm water discharges through 
the NPDES permitting program.61 
58. Id. 
59. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a) (1997) (an NPDES pennit not required for most 
stonn water discharges). 
60. See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 66, § 402(p); 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(p) (1988). 
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) provides, in pertinent part, the following: 
(p) Municipal and industrial storm water discharges 
(1) General rule. Prior to October 1, 1992, the Administrator or the 
State (in the case of a permit program approved under this section) 
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The Clean Water Act's storm water requirements are set 
forth at Section 402(p) of the Act.62 Section 402(p) creates a 
process which in large part replicates, in the storm water pollu-
tion context, the initial implementation process for the Section 
402 program carried out by EPA and a number of the states 
during the 1970's. The section provides an initial five year 
grace period for most storm water dischargers.63 The section 
sets forth the effluent limitation standards to be applied by the 
storm water permits.64 For industrial discharges, these are the 
same technology-based standards required at Section 301.65 
For municipalities, a "maximum extent practicable" standard is 
set forth with brief elaboration.66 Section 402(p) then sets out 
shall not require a permit under this section for discharges composed 
entirely of stormwater. 
(2)Exceptions 
Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to the following stormwater 
discharges: (A) A discharge with respect to which a permit has been 
issued under this section before February 4, 1987. (B) A discharge as-
sociated with industrial activity.(C)A discharge from a municipal sepa-
rate storm sewer system serving a population of 250,000 or more.(D)A 
discharge from a municipal separate storm sewer system serving a 
population of 100,000 or more but less than 250,000.(E) A discharge for 
which the Administrator or the State, as the case may be, determines 
that stormwater discharge contributes to a violation of a water quality 
standard or is a significant contributor of pollutants to waters of the 
United States. 
(3) Permit requirements (A)Industrial discharges. Permits for dis-
charges associated with industrial activity shall meet all applicable 
provisions of this section and section 1311 of this title.(B)Municipal dis-
charge. Permits for discharges from municipal storm sewers -(i)may 
be issued on a system- or jurisdiction-wide basis; (ii)shall include a re-
quirement to effectively prohibit non-stormwater discharges into the 
storm sewers; and (iii)shall require controls to reduce the discharge of 
pollutants to the maximum extent practicable, including management 
practices, control techniques and system, design and engineering meth-
ods, and such other provisions as the Administrator or the State deter-
mines appropriate for the control of such pollutants. [d. 
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (1988). 
63. See Clean Water Act § 402(p)(l), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(1). Compare Clean Wa-
ter Act § 402(k), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (giving permit applicants a slightly more than two 
year grace period to receive and comply with an NPDES permit); Clean Water Act § 
301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (providing that dischargers shall comply with appropriate 
technology-based effiuent limitations, set forth in NPDES permits, by July 1, 1977, 
almost five years after the Act was signed into law). 
64. See Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3). Compare Clean Water 
Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
66. See Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(iii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii). See su-
pra note 61 for the text of the section. In at least one instance, the municipal standard 
ofMmaximum extent practicable" has been dermed as equivalent to BAT. 
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a schedule for dischargers to apply for permits and for EPA to 
issue permits as well as regulations.67 Thus, although storm 
water discharges were not exempted from the original NPDES 
program, Congress, in effect, decided to acknowledge EPA's 
determination to defer regulating storm water, but provided 
the agency with programmatic guidance to bring storm water 
into the NPDES. 
Almost without exception, prior NPDES permits issued un-
der the Act included numerical effluent limitations, prepared 
by the agencies, controlling the specific quantity of pollution 
that a discharger could release through its wastewater. The 
only responsibility delegated to the discharger was to deter-
mine how they would comply with those limitations. The 
agency was solely responsible, after mandated public participa-
tion requirements, for determining the limitations. Under the 
framework established for storm water, numerical effluent 
limitations are de-emphasized as a regulatory tool except for a 
small fraction of the larger industrial dischargers covered by 
EPA's national categorical standards.68 In California, the prac-
tical effect of that conceptual shift has amounted to a delega-
tion to both municipalities and industry to determine, to a sig-
nificant degree, what quality of their storm water discharges is 
deemed to be sufficient.69 As for the industrial permit in Cali-
67. See Clean Water Act § 402(p)(4)..(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)..(6). Compare Clean 
Water Act § 306(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b) (establishing deadline for EPA promulgation of 
standards of performance for various industrial categories to be sued to establish effiu-
ent limitations in NPDES permits). Section 402(p)(5) provides for studies to address 
any interim concerns from storm water discharges excused from the permitting pro-
gram during the first five years of the program. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(5). See also 40 
C.F.R. § 122.26(c)..(d) (1997) (EPA's permit application requirements for industrial and 
municipal storm water dischargers). 
68. See Citizens For A Better Environment v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir 1991) 
(unsuccessful challenge to municipal storm water permit for failure to include numeric 
effiuent limitations). 
69. In California, this trend is especially true in the formulation and implementa-
tion of municipal storm water permits. In the San Francisco Bay area, for example, the 
municipal permits issued thus far to municipalities in Santa Clara and Alameda Coun-
ties rely almost exclusively on storm water management plans drafted by the munici-
palities, with fmal approval resting with staff of the local Regional Water Quality Con-
trol Board, largely outside of any formal public review process. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, the municipal permits have provided an exception for the city's storm water 
discharges to comply with water quality standards where they have followed their self-
drafted SWMP. This new style of NPDES permit serves to cut the interested public out 
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fornia, two significant holdovers from prior forms of NPDES 
permits maintain much of the integrity of the permits - the 
requirement that industrial facilities must achieve BAT and 
the requirement that, regardless of the pollution control tech-
nology applied, their discharges meet all applicable water 
quality standards. 
The State of California opted to implement the industrial 
storm water regulations through the issuance of a statewide 
general permit.70 The State's reliance on a general permit was 
based on lessening the "overwhelming administrative burden 
associated with start up of a new program to regulate indus-
trial storm water discharges" and because "[i]t is ... the least 
costly way for a discharger to obtain a permit and comply with 
USEPA's regulations.''71 The application process consists of a 
of the pennit drafting and enforcement process to a significant degree because the 
programs tend to be very complicated with numerous plans addressing different cate-
gories of pollution sources and municipal actions (including, e.g., inspection programs, 
educational programs, sewer maintenance programs, enforcement programs, etc.). 
Because the individual plans are drafted and approved outside of the fonnal pennitting 
issuing authority, the public is at a distinct disadvantage in attempting to keep up 
with the perpetually evolving pennits. 
As to enforcement, because water quality standards have effectively been written 
out of the municipal penn its, enforcement is limited to overseeing implementation of 
the program rather than responding to excessive pollution. Given the complexity of the 
programs and the once per year filing of an annual report describing in brief the entire 
effort, it is almost impossible for either agency staff or a citizen to ever really under-
stand what is going on on the ground in any given municipality and whether any par-
ticular plan is being implemented as described. 
In response to this steady decline in clarity of the municipal pennits, San Francisco 
BayKeeper has filed administrative changes with the State Water Resources Control 
Board for the two municipal permits issued thus far by the San Francisco Bay regional 
Board - the Santa Clara and Alameda county pennits. At least one other challenge 
also was filed against a pennit issued to Orange County by the Regional Water Quality 
Control Board for the San Diego Region. In response, the State Water Resources Con-
trol Board recently issued an order, responding to the EHC petition but establishing 
language to be used throughout the State of California making municipalities subject 
to water quality standards as of the next reissuance of their pennits. 
70. NPDES General Pennit No. CASOOOOOI [State Water Resources Control 
Board) Water Quality Order No. 91-13-DWQ (as amended by Water Quality Order 92-
12 DWQ) issued pursuant to Section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §1342 ("General Per-
mit"). See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28 (1997) (authorizing the use of general pennits in certain 
instances). 
71. FACT SHEET FOR NPDES GENERAL PERMIT (as amended September 17, 1992) 
FOR STORM WATER DISCHARGES AssOCIATED WITH INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES EXCLUDING 
CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES ("1992 GENERAL PERMIT FACT SHEET") 2 (Oct. 15, 1992). In 
issuing the general pennit, the State Board, however, noted its expectation "that as the 
stonn water program develops, the Regional Water Boards will issue individual and 
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simple requirement that existing facilities subject to its terms 
have filed a Notice of Intent ("NOI") for coverage under the 
permit by March 30, 1992. 
The terms of the General Permit consist of three principle 
components - development and implementation by each facil-
ity of a Storm Water Pollution Prevention Program ("SWPPP"), 
development and implementation of a Monitoring and Report-
ing Program ("RPM"), and specific prohibitions of water quality 
impairing discharges. 
A. STORM WATER POLLUTION PREVENTION PROGRAM 
Section A( 1) of the General Permit requires dischargers to 
have developed and implemented a SWPPP no later than Octo-
ber 1, 1992. The SWPPP must include pollution control meas-
ures that are equivalent to BAT and Best Conventional Pollut-
ant Control Technology ("BCT").72 The SWPPP must also in-
clude, among other elements: (1) a description of potential 
sources of pollutants to the storm water system; (2) a site map 
showing the storm water conveyance system and areas of ac-
tual and potential pollutant contact; (3) a description of storm 
water management practices and preventive maintenance; and 
(4) a summary of storm water sampling points. Provision A(6) 
of the General Permit requires dischargers to eliminate non-
storm water discharges to storm water conveyance systems 
prior to the implementation of the SWPPP.73 
general permits which regulate discharges specific either to industrial categories or to 
watersheds." Id. 
72. Although the permit uses the phrase "best management practices" in a num-
ber of its provisions, it is important to emphasize that the Act itself does not anticipate 
"management practices" as the applicable control standard for industrial storm water 
dischargers. Management practices are only referred to in the context of municipal 
storm water programs. Compare § 402(pX3XBXiii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(pX3XBXiii) and § 
402(pX3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(A). Indeed, use by the Act of the actual phrase 
"best management practices" is limited to non-point sources of pollution governed by 
area-wide management plans authorized by section 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288. Industrial 
dischargers governed by California's General Permit are not "non-point source" dis-
charges. They are, by defmition, point source discharges governed by the NPDES 
permitting program. 
73. The SWPPP components were further specified in the reissuance of the Gen-
eral permit on April 17, 1997. See State Water Board Water Quality order No. 97-03-
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B. MONITORING AND REPOR'l'ING PROGRAM 
Section B(2) of the General Permit requires that dischargers 
have prepared and implemented a Monitoring and Reporting 
Program no later than January 1, 1993. Section B(5)(a) re-
quires that dischargers conduct site inspections to identify ar-
eas contributing to storm water discharges and to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the SWPPP measures in reducing pollutant 
loading. Section B(5)(b) and (c) requires dischargers to conduct 
observations to identify sources of non-storm water pollution 
and to identify all storm water discharge locations that produce 
a significant storm water discharge. Section B(5)(d)(i) requires 
dischargers to sample and analyze during the wet season for 
pH, total suspended solids ("TSS"), specific conductance, and 
total organic content ("TOC") or oil and grease. Section 
B(5)(d)(ii) requires sampling for toxic chemicals and other pol-
lutants likely to be in the storm water discharged from the fa-
cility. Section B(1!) requires dischargers to collect samples 
from all locations where storm water is discharged. 
C. SPECIFIC PROHIBITIONS CONTAINED IN THE GENERAL 
PERMIT 
The Act prohibits storm water discharges associated with 
industrial activity without a permit.74 Provision A(1) of the 
General Permit prohibits discharge of material other than 
storm water to a storm sewer system or waters of the nation, 
unless such discharges are regulated by a NPDES permit. 
Provision A(3) of the Permit prohibits the discharge of storm 
water which causes or threatens to cause pollution, contamina-
tion, or nuisance. Provision B(1) of the Permit prohibits the 
discharge of storm water to surface or groundwater which ad-
versely impacts human health or the environment. 
The General Permit applies to a broad range of industrial 
facilities, ranging from automobile wrecking yards to hazard-
ous waste treatment facilities, to mines to transportation facili-
DWQ NPDES General Permit No. CASOOOOOI ("1997 General Permit"), Section A (pp. 
11·23). 
74. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (1997). 
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ties.75 For the first time in the history of the Clean Water Act, 
numerous small businesses have been brought within its per-
mitting program who, certainly in 1992, likely had little famili-
arity with the Act and the implementing agencies. Hence, for 
the first three years that California has issued permits, much 
of the agencies' efforts have focused on informing the regulated 
industries of their obligations under the permit program. Al-
though by 1997, many facilities had filed NOI's with the State 
Board, many other facilities remained outside of the program 
despite its coverage of their operations. Thus, despite the Gen-
eral Permit's goals of minimizing burdens on agency staff, the 
sheer number of facilities and the need to search them out 
where they have not come forward voluntarily remains a 
daunting administrative task for the State Board and Regional 
Boards. 
v. REFLECTIONS ON CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT: "MOMS 
AND POPS" AND THE ELUSIVE MAXIMUM PENALTY 
The course of citizen enforcement of the storm water re-
quirements appears to be following a path similar to the initial 
history of citizen enforcement under the Act. Like the initial 
phase of the NPDES permit program, the storm water program 
has started with a period of relatively little enforcement while 
the program has come on line.76 Like the proliferation of citi-
zen suits under the NPDES program in the early to late 1980's 
as compared to a de-proliferation of EPA and state actions, citi-
zen suits under the storm water program, especially in Califor-
nia, began in the vacuum of few state and EPA actions and 
have quickly outnumbered the efforts of the state's Regional 
Water Quality Control Boards. Whereas citizen suits under 
the "traditional" NPDES permits peaked and indeed appeared 
75. See 1997 General Permit, Attachment l. 
76. NRDC itself has played its traditional role in policing EPA's implementation of 
the nationwide storm water program prescribed by Congress. As is noted below, how-
ever, NRDC has still played an important role as a citizen enforcer in California, albeit, 
that national organization's strategies have taken on a decidedly regional character, 
focusing on two regions of the State - Los Angeles and San Diego - and pursued 
through alliances with two watershed-based groups - Santa Monica BayKeeper and 
San Diego BayKeeper. 
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to tail off as of the early 1990's, the sheer number of facilities 
governed by the storm water requirements and the more local-
ized nature of the citizen enforcers leading this new wave of 
citizen enforcement likely will result in a longer period of time 
than a single decade where citizen action will playa role com-
parable to the agencies themselves. Moreover, because of the 
more local character of the groups, with a more intimate 
. knowledge not only of their local watersheds but also a more 
thorough and personal knowledge of their local enforcement 
agencies, this period of enforcement promises to be character-
ized by more cooperative relationships between agency and 
citizens than the Gwaltney era portended. 
About four years into the storm water program, i.e., in the 
past two years, a wave of enforcement actions under the Gen-
eral Permits has begun. Whereas the government had a 
roughly seven-year head start on enforcing the original NPDES 
permit program, an interesting thing about the storm water 
enforcement actions is that a vast majority of even the initial 
enforcement cases under the storm water program have been 
brought by citizen groups, in particular the BayKeeper pro-
grams in San Francisco Bay, Santa Monica Bay and San Diego 
Bay, as well as the Stockton-based DeltaKeeper, a project of 
San Francisco BayKeeper.77 San Francisco BayKeeper alone 
has brought 30 actions to enforce the General Permit in the 
last two years. In total, about 60 storm water enforcement ac-
tions have been initiated by citizen groups throughout the 
State of California.78 This is more than the number of en-
77. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws 
(Part III), 14 Envt'l Law Rep. (Envt'l L. Inst.) 10407, 10424 (Nov. 1984) (noting a dras-
tic increase in citizen enforcement efforts, especially under the Clean Water Act, be-
ginning in 1983 while the government's initially vigorous enforcement trailed off sig-
nificantly beginning in the early 1980's). 
78. In addition to San Francisco BayKeeper and DeltaKeeper's thirty enforcement 
actions, the total actions brought by other citizen groups include the following: Santa 
Monica BayKeeper and the Natural Resources Defense Council - eleven actions (see 
telephone interview with Terry Tamminen, Executive Director, Santa Monica 
BayKeeper, Sept., 1997); Communities For A Better Environment ("CBE") - five actions 
(see telephone interview with Richard Drury, Legal Director, CBE, Sept., 1997); Envi-
ronmental Protection and Information Center ("EPIC") - four cases (see interview with 
Sharon Duggan, Legal Counsel for EPIC, Sept., 1997); San Diego BayKeeper - three 
cases (see telephone interview with Ken Moser, Executive Director, San Diego 
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forcements brought by the Regional Boards throughout the 
State.79 
This result is not surprising given the huge number offacili-
ties covered by the General Permit and the relatively small 
amount of staff time assigned to the storm water program at 
each Regional Board. In addition, the relative prominence of 
citizen enforcement reflects the collected knowledge gained by 
environmental organizations from almost two decades of expe-
rience enforcing environmental laws. That collective experi-
ence, carried by individuals who started as interns or associ-
ates with many of the environmental groups, like NRDC and 
NJPIRG, who were bringing those cases in the mid-1980's, has 
allowed the groups in California to play a quicker and more 
prominent role in enforcing the storm water requirements, 
relative to the government agencies. 
The new storm water requirements underscore the need for 
citizen enforcement. With perhaps tens of thousands of facili-
ties to be inspected and convinced of the need to comply with 
the storm water requirements, many staff persons within the 
BayKeeper); Northern California River Watch ("NCRW") - 4 actions (see telephone 
interview with Jack Silver, Executive Director of NCRW, Sept., 1997). 
See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 945 F. 
Supp. 1330 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Depart-
ment of Transportation, 96 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1996); Hughey v. JMS Development 
Corp., 78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996). 
79. Some of the known enforcement actions by the various regional boards to date 
include the following: In re Placer County, Order No. 6-94-21 (Jan. 14, 1994) ($900 
administrative penalty); In re RH Acquisition, RWQCB San Diego Region Order No. 
94-20 (May 12, 1994) ($306,000 administrative penalty with $290,000 suspended upon 
compliance, i.e. $16,000 penalty for violations of General Construction storm water 
permit); In re Browman Development Company, Inc., RWQCB North Coast Region, 
Complaint No. 94-84 (June 23, 1994) ($10,000 administrative penalty); In re Cham-
berlain Nelson Ranch, Ltd., RWQCB North Coast Region, Order No. 96-35 (May 23, 
1996) ($10,000 administrative penalty); In re City of Santa Rosa Fountain Grove 
Parkway Extension Project, Complaint No. 96-23 (May 23, 1996) ($10,000 administra-
tive penalty); In re Forecast Homes, Inc., RWQCB Central Valley, Order No. 96-226 
(Aug. 9, 1996) ($10,000 administrative penalty for construction site storm water viola-
tions); In re Placer County, RWQCB Lahontan Region, Order No. 6-96-42 (June 14, 
1996 ($5,000 administrative penalty); In re Southwest Gas Corp., Complaint No. 6-96-
49 (Aug. 20, 1996) ($6,000 administrative penalty); In re Southwest Gas Corp., Com-
plaint No. 6-95-98 (Sept. 20, 1996) ($17,500 administrative penalty); RWQCB Central 
Valley Region, Order No. 97-041 (Feb. 28, 1997) ($500,000 administrative penalty 
assessed with $175,000 conditioned on paying for compliance measures, i.e. $325,000 
administrative penalty). 
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state regional boards as well as EPA understand the need to 
look outside of the agency, to environmental organizations and 
other private parties, to begin to complete the tasks envisioned 
by the storm water permit program. Just to figure out how 
many covered facilities exist and who should have applied for 
coverage under the general permit, is a Herculean task. By 
necessity, the storm water program is forging new relation-
ships between agencies and citizen groups willing to do en-
forcement work. In many ways, the limited logic of the United 
States Supreme Court's Gwaltney decision is becoming more 
and more superfluous as understaffed agencies realize the 
magnitude of enforcing the newer permitting programs, espe-
cially with regard to the storm water program, and the avail-
ability in many regions of highly efficient and professional en-
vironmental organizations willing to adopt an enforcement 
agenda. 
In addition to having a profound effect on the relationship 
between citizen groups and state agencies, another interesting 
effect of the storm water pollution enforcement actions is their 
underscoring of an apparent disparity between the relative 
harshness of the Clean Water Act's penalties on smaller busi-
nesses as compared to large companies. Fifty thousand dollars 
spent on addressing an enforcement action by a small wrecking 
yard that nets a profit of $100,000 per year compared to a $10 
million penalty assessed against a company the size of Unocal, 
which nets billions of dollars per year, is relatively a much 
heavier financial burden. 
The biggest violators are not being punished enough. Viola-
tions continue to be viewed by the largest operations as simply 
a cost of doing business and not a legal and moral obligation. 
Since enforcement of the Act began over two decades ago, the 
case law demonstrates that federal judges have been reluctant 
to utilize the full effect of the penalty provisions provided by 
Congress. Thus, no judge has ever come close to assessing the 
maximum penalties allowed by the statute of $25,000 per day 
per violation. Looking to the existing case law, citizen plain-
tiffs likewise have been unable to achieve settlements that do 
not significantly compromise the statute's maximum penalties. 
Twenty-five years into the Act, it is hard to believe that a num-
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ber of major violators have not yet come along who would have 
been penalized to the full extent of the penalty provisions. 
At the other end of the spectrum are the many smaller 
businesses who for the first time fmd themselves obligated to 
consider their contribution to water pollution. Not only is the 
Act's statutory maximum well beyond the realm of the possible 
for the average "mom and pop" shop, even the cost of the citizen 
suit process provided by the Act is a significant burden, making 
it very difficult for a many of them to even defend themselves 
in federal court should that become necessary. Although incen-
tives to settle are important, an incentive derived solely from 
the cost of the right to defend oneself is not a fair incentive. 
Hence the need for the Act to evolve to provide a citizen en-
forcement process with potentially much lower transaction 
costs that would be able to assess significant penalties where 
appropriate and encourage settlements of disputes based on 
the merits of the violation and environmental harm rather 
than the cost of litigation. 
The Act should expand in both directions. First, federal 
judges should not be so reluctant to apply the Act's maximum 
penalties where economic benefits were realized by a company 
for its noncompliance and it has substantial financial where-
withal and deterrence is costly. Judges indeed should be en-
couraged by a change to the law that would allow judgments to 
go beyond $25,000 per day when that maximum fails to dis-
gorge all ill-gotten profits or would otherwise fail adequately to 
deter a large violator or category of violators. On the other end 
of the spectrum, the Act should provide an enforcement action, 
open to citizen enforcers, which is brought before an adminis-
trative tribunal, reducing costs to both the enforcing citizen 
and the financially smaller violator. Such an administrative 
enforcement process for citizens would allow more money to be 
spent on compliance and appropriate penalties rather than 
transaction costs, such as attorney's fees and court costs, while 
maintaining citizens' ability to bring the actions by still reim-
bursing their costs and better enabling defendants to defend 
themselves by lessening the cost of their defense. 
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As the Act's scope evolves and reaches out to address the 
full range of pollution problems, so too must its enforcement 
mechanisms grow and expand. Likewise, the courts, the agen-
cies, and the citizen enforcers need to explore new ways of ef-
fectively playing their roles in implementing the Act and 
striving for its ambitious yet non-negotiable goals - fishable 
and swimmable waters. 
VI. SAN FRANCISCO BAYKEEPER AND DELTAKEEPER-
CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT COMING OF AGE 
San Francisco BayKeeper was formed eight years ago, as 
the Clean Water Act hit its late teens and the number of citizen 
enforcement cases involving larger discharges with sufficient 
numbers of violations began to tail off.80 The tailing off of citi-
zen cases did not, however, correlate to a healthy San Fran-
cisco Bay. Although many of the more apparent pollution 
problems had largely been controlled, new, less visible, but still 
highly damaging, pollution issues continued to be identified. 
Perhaps more conspicuously, BayKeeper's formation coincided 
with the development of the new storm water programs. 
A. BAyKEEPER's CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTION STRATEGIES 
BayKeeper's initial forays into citizen enforcement did not 
begin until 1993, about four years after its formation.81 From 
the beginning, BayKeeper's enforcement strategies have been 
significantly informed by its identification with a particular 
watershed and the group's constant contact with the local re-
80. See The Enforcer, S.F. CHRON., July 7, 1989, at B3; Sullied Bay Gets a De-
fender with Launching of Patrol, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 7, 1989, at lB. 
81. The first formal enforcement case brought by San Francisco BayKeeper was 
against a Bay Area gun club which was discharging lead pellets directly into the Bay_ 
See Group Wants Gun Club To Quit Filling Bay With Lead, WEST COUNTY TIMES, 
March 24,1993, at 3A; Water Board To Ban Lead Shot at Gun Clubs, WEST COUNTY 
TIMES, March 26, 1993, at 1A; Environmentalists Eye Gun Clubs Along Bay, THE 
RECORDER, March 31, 1993, at 3. BayKeeper's enforcement program then brought a 
number of cases in the Petaluma River area for violations of pretreatment require-
ments. See Group: Petaluma Hasn't Come Clean, SANTA ROSA PRESS DEMOCRAT, May 
20, 1993, at B1; Firms Work On Pollution Woes, PETALUMA ARGUS COURIER, July 20, 
1993, at 1. The fourth case which BayKeeper became involved in, along with Citizens 
For A Better Environment and others, was against the Union Oil Co. 
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gional board and other entities. In terms of its watershed, 
BayKeeper does not work on issues outside of its watershed. 
The group is limited to the Bay, the Delta, and their numerous 
tributaries. Thus, almost every issue which BayKeeper con-
fronts involves either the Regional Water Quality Control 
Board for the San Francisco Bay Region or the Central Valley 
Region, the two regional boards which cover the Bay and 
Delta.82 As a matter of practice, a BayKeeper representative is 
interacting with Board staff on a daily basis. This is significant 
because, unlike in the 1970's and 80's, when industry in gen-
eral had a larger presence in front of the agencies implement-
ing the Clean Water Act, the BayKeeper model shows that a 
watershed-based group can maintain a greater presence in 
front of a water quality agency than even the largest company 
as long as the group maintains its focus on a particular water-
shed. By coupling that presence with carefully developed and 
thoughtfully implemented independent strategies and appro-
priate advance notice to the local agency, BayKeeper has be-
come part of the regulatory landscape in the Bay Area and, 
more recently, the Delta. 
As in other areas of the country, BayKeeper's initial wait of 
four years to mount an enforcement program, in part, had 
much to do with the fact that there were not many "traditional" 
Clean Water Act cases to be brought in the Bay Area. Thus, 
BayKeeper's initial cases began by focusing on a number of 
pretreatment enforcement actions and a few simple, but some-
what exotic pollution discharges, most notably discharges of 
lead shot into the Bay from local skeet and trap shooting 
ranges. 
Those initial cases, and especially the Unocal case described 
below, served as a transition for BayKeeper from cases that 
largely looked like the traditional citizen enforcement actions 
into new arenas that were just coming on line. By 1995, 
BayKeeper began setting the stage for mounting a coordinated 
82. There are nine regional water quality control boards in California organized 
more or less on a regional watershed basis. 
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and sustained effort to assure that the new storm water re-
quirements were being complied with by local industries. 
Over the years, BayKeeper has developed an integrated 
three prong strategy for pursuing citizen enforcement cases. 
The three prongs include some form of an agency-based initia-
tive, an ability to bring an independent citizen enforcement 
action, and media or public outreach. Each is formulated for 
specific cases (or categories of cases) to maximize the local 
agency's ability to coordinate with BayKeeper's agenda and to 
assure, one way or another, that a pollution problem is re-
solved. Cooperation with the agency is heightened by the com-
plete integration of the three prongs. 
In terms of an agency initiative, BayKeeper in most in-
stances will offer the agency's staff the option of focusing on 
sites that the group has identified, usually many months before 
a notice letter has been sent. We are, in fact, working with our 
local agency to help them identify those cases and sites that fit 
within their own priorities. BayKeeper also tends to be very 
forthright with agency staff about our ability to bring our own 
enforcement action and whether the group is prepared to do so 
in any given instance. 
As for media, Bay Keeper focuses on the polluter - not the 
agency. Unless there is direct collusion between the agency 
and a polluter, there is generally nothing gained by criticizing 
the local agency for "not doing its job" or otherwise blaming the 
agency for a polluter's action. Instead, a strategy of encour-
agement coupled with a demonstration of independent action 
has established relationships between BayKeeper's program 
and two local regional boards that truly are interactive, mutu-
ally supporting enforcement roles. 
It may well be that BayKeeper's strategies are effective only 
in the context of California's water quality regulatory system. 
California's system consists of multiple tiers, starting with staff 
level decisions, followed by consideration by a nine member 
regional board and finishing with review by the State Water 
Resources Control Board. The interaction with staff and the 
public is, generally, one on one and outside of the public eye. 
o 
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The Regional Boards do business at monthly public meetings, 
interacting with the public through a reasonably formal hear-
ing process. That mix of internal staff process and decision 
making with the public venue before the regional boards es-
tablishes a dynamic where staff can never be entirely sure 
what the regional boards' decisions will be, especially where 
public interest organizations, among others, have established a 
rapport with the Board and have earned a level of respect from 
its members. 
Likewise, the fact that the Regional Board itself is not the 
last word likely makes its decisions somewhat more reflective 
of the range of concerns brought to bear on any given decision. 
In states where the agency delegated with responsibility to im-
plement its water quality laws has only one tier or a second tier 
that consists solely of, for example, a review board that does 
not regularly interact with the public but only individual ap-
pellants, it is likely that its decisions tend to be more rigid and 
rely on less interaction amongst various stakeholders prior to 
the decisions proposal. 
B. THE BAYKEEPER STRATEGY AT WORK: THREE CASE STUDIES 
The best way to explain how BayKeeper's program has func-
tioned over the last three years and to evaluate the employed 
strategies' application to other state regulatory regimes is to 
provide a number of case studies which cover a spectrum of 
dischargers. 
1. The Junk Yard Initiative 
One of the industrial categories covered by California's gen-
eral storm water permit is wrecking and scrap yards.83 
Wrecking yards and scrap yards can be significant sources of 
pollutants, including heavy metals, oil and grease, PCB's and 
solvents. In 1995, in the San Francisco Bay Area, that cate-
gory of industrial facilities was believed to be one where sig-
nificant numbers of facilities were not complying with the Gen-
83. See General Permit at 42 (Sector M. Automobile Salvage Yards, SIC 5015). 
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eral Permit, in many cases failing to even file the requisite no-
tice of intent to operate under the General Permit. The con-
cern was heightened by the propensity of junk yards and scrap 
yards to have been historically located along the edge of the 
Bay in what were considered fifty years ago to be swamps, i.e., 
the delicate marsh habitat around the fringe of the Bay.84 Al-
though a significant potential source of storm water contami-
nation, the wrecking yards are a good example of facilities for 
which, in general, the Act's citizen enforcement procedures 
could be better tuned to the facilities' violations if they included 
a less costly, administrative enforcement process, in addition to 
the existing litigation option. 
a. Waiting for the Agency - Patience As an Agency Strategy 
As BayKeeper looked into the issue of junkyards' storm wa-
ter pollution beginning in mid-1995, through meetings with 
regional board staff, it learned that the agency was intending 
to send out a general letter to every junk yard in the region 
which it believed may be covered by a storm water permit but 
had not signed onto the General Permit. Much to the agency's 
credit, staff had prepared a comprehensive list of potential 
wrecking yard and scrap yard facilities who likely were subject 
to the general storm water permit. Because of considerable 
uncertainty and the time needed by staff to visually inspect all 
of the potential yards, the letter was to include a response form 
which also allowed a particular facility to explain why it be-
lieved it was not covered by the General Permit. In order to 
allow the board to implement its strategy, BayKeeper adjusted 
its storm water enforcement agenda to focus on other types of 
facilities for the time being. 
About eight months after BayKeeper was informed by the 
board staff of their intentions, no letters had yet gone out to 
any junk yards or scrap yards. Around that time, BayKeeper 
got a call on its hotline (1-800 KEEP BAY), describing signifi-
cant amounts of pollution at a wrecking yard facility in 
84. It is estimated that 95% of the Bay's historic wetland areas of been destroyed. 
Of the 5% remaining, many of the largest junkyards can be found nearby. 
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Hayward, California, run by Pick Your Part, Inc. BayKeeper 
investigators paid their $1 and toured the yard, cameras in 
hand. The thirteen acre yard was located adjacent to a drain-
age channel which separated it from a seasonal marsh area 
and a portion of Hayward Shoreline Park District.85 The yard 
was a do-it-yourself facility which allowed customers to identify 
the auto part they wanted and remove it on their own. Of 
course, the care and cleanliness with which that removal proc-
ess occurred varied from one customer to another. The un-
paved yard was strewn with hub caps filled with used motor 
oil, numerous oil spills, dripping car parts, overturned batter-
ies, spills of glycol, and lead releasing radiators. During rain 
events, each of those observed contaminants would be mobi-
lized and discharged into adjacent channels and ultimately the 
southeastern portion of San Francisco Bay. 
BayKeeper has an obligation to respond to incidents re-
ported to it on its hotline, therefore, BayKeeper continued to 
investigate the Pick Your Part site. As a result, the group put 
together the information necessary to prepare a notice of intent 
to sue letter triggering a citizen enforcement action to remedy 
the obvious storm water issues at the site. BayKeeper called 
the Regional Board staff to inform them of the observed viola-
tions at this particular site. That call triggered a quick site 
visit by the agency, the City, and the Park District to the facil-
ity. However, no particular agency enforcement strategy was 
triggered by the visit. Having waited eight months for the Re-
gional Board letter, BayKeeper opted to move ahead with an 
enforcement action, and the Regional Board staff did not object. 
b. Independent Action 
In 1996, BayKeeper filed a notice of intent to sue against 
Pick Your Part for violations of the general storm water permit. 
The violations BayKeeper had observed at the facility included 
the facility's failure to prepare an adequate SWPPP, failure to 
implement its existing SWPPP, and failure to adequately moni-
85. See Wrecking Firm Accused Of Polluting Wetlands, HAYWARD DAILY REVIEW, 
September 27, 1995, at A-I. 
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tor discharges from the site. Before the end of the sixty day 
notice period, Bay Keeper held several settlement meetings 
with the company and reached an agreement in principle. 
BayKeeper filed a complaint and a consent decree in the case 
simultaneously. Through the consent decree, the company 
agreed to comply with the General Permit. The compliance 
measures to which it agreed included paving the entire yard 
and directing flows to a collection system, installing a treat-
ment system removing both oil and grease and heavy metals to 
less than Basin Plan standards, reorganizing the yard to re-
move certain car parts from uncovered areas, removing debris 
scattered throughout the adjacent marsh, and adjusting their 
procedures to minimize the carelessness of customers. In addi-
tion to complying with the statute, the company agreed to pay 
a $50,000 mitigation fund towards local water quality projects. 
Lastly, Pick Your Part paid $12,000 to reimburse BayKeeper 
for its investigation costs and covering its attorneys' fees to 
prepare the notice, complaint, negotiate, and prepare the con-
sent decree. 
In terms of junk yards, Pick Your Part was a somewhat spe-
cial case, being a relatively large company with wrecking yards 
throughout California, and a few in Arizona. Most yards are 
owner-operated and have much fewer resources to draw upon 
than Pick Your Part. With that fact in mind, BayKeeper nev-
ertheless resolved to follow up on the Pick Your Part action in a 
manner that was sensitive to the corporate size of most yards, 
but at the same time did not shy away from enforcing the law. 
BayKeeper assembled a group of twelve attorneys and volun-
teers. Starting with the list of wre.cking yards prepared by 
Board staff, BayKeeper's teams began systematically visiting 
yards in three counties representing different areas of the San 
Francisco Bay watershed. In all, BayKeeper looked at thirty 
different facilities. Some of the inspections were on-site where 
the yards allowed the public in for a fee. Many of the inspec-
tions were done from the fence line, observing the presence or 
absence of storm water controls such as berming or roofing, 
and gauging the amount of fluids and dirty car parts exposed to 
storms and the likely drainage patterns from the yards. Many 
of the inspections were done during or immediately after rain 
events, where the drainage from the site was clearly apparent. 
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Ultimately, BayKeeper selected seventeen sites which it in-
tended to send notice letters to, one of which contained eight-
een separate tenants with a multitude of storm water contami-
nation concerns. 
One key element of BayKeeper's strategy was to send all 
eighteen notices at the same time. This allowed BayKeeper to 
respond effectively to claims by individual yards, almost all of 
whom were small businesses, that BayKeeper was unfairly 
singling them out. By covering eighteen facilities with twenty-
nine different operators all at once, no one could maintain such 
a claim for long. . 
A second key element to BayKeeper's junk yard strategy 
was a policy of full disclosure to the Regional Board and its 
staff. Of course, BayKeeper already had informed Regional 
Board staff of the Pick Your Part case. After completing the 
investigation work on the additional sites, but prior to sending 
the notice letters, BayKeeper arranged for a meeting with Re-
gional Board staff and laid out its information on each of the 
sites of concern. At that time, roughly one year had passed 
since staff had indicated its intention to send the compliance 
letters to the numerous potential non-filers they had identified. 
Roughly half of the sites investigated by BayKeeper were in-
cluded on that list. A main question asked at this update 
meeting was whether there was a scheduled date for the Re-
gional Board letters to go out. When staff informed BayKeeper 
that there was not an anticipated date, they acknowledged that 
the group had been very patient in allowing the agency to fol-
low through on its strategy prior to triggering any citizen en-
forcement and, at that point, welcomed BayKeeper's assistance 
in addressing the storm water concerns for bay area junk 
yards. 
With staff's acknowledgment of the merits of BayKeeper's 
strategy, the notices were sent on a single day, accompanied by 
a Bay Area-wide press release. The following week, at the first 
scheduled Regional Board meeting, BayKeeper made a presen-
tation to the Regional Board itself, during the public forum 
portion of the meeting, describing the notice letters and the 
concern about junk yards, and thanking staff for their assis-
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tance and own efforts in addressing this considerable area of 
concern. The presentation elicited a number of comments from 
the Board members, unanimously thanking BayKeeper for its 
help, recognizing the significant noncompliance by many facili-
ties of the storm water permit and the related importance of 
enforcing the storm water requirements. Armed with that 
agency support, BayKeeper began negotiations and followed 
through on the notices. 
Of the original eighteen notices, seventeen have resulted in 
negotiated settlements, both in and out of court. Of particular 
note was the, so far, partial resolution of the site which in-
cludes eighteen separate tenants. Referred to by its address, 
716 McCosker Street was a sprawling yard located at the end 
of a lonely road on the edge of the Bay's wetland fringe in 
Richmond, California, a few hundred feet from Wildcat Creek. 
Of all the junk yards observed during BayKeeper's investiga-
tion, this particular site was the worst polluted site. None of 
the required documents had been filed pursuant to the General 
Permit, including the notice of intent to operate under the 
permit. No efforts at all had been made to prevent contami-
nated storm water from running off the property and into 
nearby Wildcat Creek. 
The complexities of addressing contamination at this site 
were considerable. First, with eighteen tenants, each with car 
parts, wrecks, tires and debris piled high in no particular or-
der, evaluating all the potential contamination was a daunting 
task. Second, all of the tenants were very small businesses 
.with few resources. Many were hobbyists working on cars as a 
part time activity. Third, the owner of the land was the widow 
of a gentleman who originally had purchased the land and 
leased it cheaply to many of the tenants shortly after World 
War II when they returned from tours of duty looking to start 
small businesses to make a living. 
In addition to the complexities of the site and its owner's 
and operators' situation, the Regional Board staff were inter-
ested in bringing their own enforcement action for 716 McCo-
sker Street. Board staff sent a notice of violation to the owner 
of the building, and one to each of the tenants. Because 
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BayKeeper had already sent its notice, that notice of violation 
did not trigger any preclusion effect under Section 309(g) of the 
Act. Nevertheless, BayKeeper requested, and staff agreed, to 
bring, in effect, a joint administrative action against the owner. 
Thus, BayKeeper and staff, together, negotiated a settlement 
with the owner. The terms included compliance steps consis-
tent with the owner's fmancial wherewithal. 
The agreement was broken out into two settlement pieces. 
The first was a settlement agreement between the owner and 
BayKeeper providing for reimbursement of costs and attorneys' 
fees associated with the noti'ce and negotiations. The second 
piece was to be handled by the Regional Board, and was to in-
clude a Cease and Desist Order t.o cover the agreed-upon com-
pliance steps and an Administrative Civil Liability Order 
("ACL") covering the agreed-upon mitigation fund.86 Although 
creative and agreed upon by the owner, the Regional Board 
staff, unfortunately, has failed to propose either of the orders 
contemplated by the settlement agreement even one year after 
the agreement was reached. BayKeeper's next step will be to 
petition the Regional Board to get the staff to act. 
The other junk yard agreements were more traditional in 
nature, consisting generally of a consent decree negotiated by 
the parties and signed by the court, requiring certain enumer-
ated compliance steps and a payment of a mitigation fund to-
wards projects seeking to improve the health of San Francisco 
Bay in the vicinity of the facility.87 In addition to consent de-
crees, a number of the cases were resolved using settlement 
86. In lieu of an administrative penalty, the Regional Board allows for the pay-
ment of mitigation projects relating to the health of San Francisco Bay in the vicinity of 
violations alleged in an ACL. 
87. Compliance generally would consist ofberming the facility, roofmg certain op-
erations at the facility, installing treatment for petroleum where appropriate, install-
ing settling basins, and monitoring. 
In most of the cases, mitigation funds were paid to the San Francisco Bay Citizen 
Action Fund managed by The Rose Foundation, a private foundation based in Oakland, 
California. Each consent decree would earmark the mitigation fund towards projects 
in a specific geographic area related to the facility. The Rose Foundation would pro-
vide a letter agreeing to abide by the terms of the consent decree and, through a grant 
making process, distribute the funds to deserving projects, not including San Francisco 
BayKeeper, and track their expenditure by the grantees. 
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agreements, the terms of which were incorporated into a 
stipulation to dismiss the action.88 
The constant refrains from many of the junk yards related 
to their limited resources. In negotiating the cases, BayKeeper 
had to constantly evaluate the merits of claims of poverty and, 
where the information we had bore them out, attempt to mini-
mize the need for the court action to drive the negotiation. In 
short, in order to assure the availability of funds to pay for nec-
essary clean-up and compliance measures, BayKeeper could 
not, without first exhausting other avenues, use the court proc-
ess to its fullest extent. Although the cost of the court process 
itself provided the yards a great incentive to settle their cases, 
Bay Keeper would have preferred to have more access to motion 
practice without the extra concern that it would bankrupt a 
defendant or use up all of their compliance money. Likewise, 
fairness required that the yards should have had the opportu-
nity to argue any defenses before a judge. 
The junk yard strategy was effective as a means of getting 
the attention of hundreds of other yards throughout the State 
of California. One of BayKeeper's mantras at this point is that 
enforcement is the best educational tool. As· soon as the eight-
een notice letters were received by the individual facilities, it 
was a short routing to industry associations such as the South-
ern California Auto Dismantlers Association ("SCADA"). In 
addition to attempting to mediate several of the cases, each of 
the associations quickly spread the news of the notice letters to 
all of their other members. There likely would not have been a 
quicker way to get the attention of almost every wrecking yard 
in the State.89 
88. Regardless of form, and despite not being labeled "consent judgments," each of 
BayKeeper's settlements is reviewed by EPA for the 45 day period anticipated by stat-
ute. See Clean Water Act § 505(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3) (1988). 
89. The educational impact was not limited potential violators. It also has stirred 
considerable activity by many other environmental groups sharing similar agendas to 
that of San Francisco BayKeeper and DeltaKeeper. Santa Monica BayKeeper and San 
Diego BayKeeper have now filed a total of five notices, which have gone out to junk 
yards. Additionally, notices have been sent to junk yards in northern California on 
behalf of the Northern California River Watch. 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss3/7
1998] SAN FRANCISCO BAYKEEPER MODEL 467 
Since sending the original eighteen wrecking yard notices, 
another three notices have been sent to and enforcement ac-
tions filed against another three Bay area wrecking yards -
two in American Canyon along the Napa River and one in 
OalUand. One other notice has gone out to a scrap yard facility 
in Stockton, California, on behalf of DeltaKeeper. Ultimately 
the true test of the success of the junk yard initiative will be 
the measurable improvement in Bay and Delta junk yards' 
storm water control measures and a high rate of voluntary 
compliance by the industry.90 
2. The Port of Stockton 
The Port of Stockton is an example of a case involving the 
relatively new storm water requirements for which the Act's 
enforcement procedures in federal court are well tailored. The 
Port is one of seven ports servicing the Bay, Delta and Central 
Valley area. Stockton is a bulk terminal, storing and moving 
very large amounts of materials associated predominantly with 
the agricultural industry.91 The facility is characterized by 
large brilliant yellow piles of sulfur, black hills of coke and coal, 
and large mounds of wood chips. The piles are uncovered, ex-
posed to rainfall. Prior to mid-1996, storm water flowing off of 
those piles was, to a significant degree, allowed to flow unim-
peded into the Port's storm drain system and directly into the 
adjacent San Joaquin River and the Stockton Deep Water 
Channe1.92 
90. Additionally, the initiative has helped to keep the Regional Board focused on 
pollution issues stemming from junk yards, albeit the focus has been somewhat tenta-
tive. Despite staft's efforts to document existing junk yards over two years ago, staff is 
only recently getting around to proposing a number of enforcement actions. At the 
Board's February 1998 Board meeting, the Regional Board assessed its first fme 
against a violating wrecking yard, contrary to staft's recommendation for the Board to 
delay its decision based on the alleged violators belated acknowledgment of the viola-
tion complaint. 
91. See RWQCB, Central Valley Region, Order No. 97-042 (NPDES No. 
CA0084077) Waste Discharge Requirements for Stockton Port District, Facility-Wide 
Storm Water Discharges From Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System and Non-
storm Water Discharges From the Port of Stockton, San Joaquin County ("Port Per-
mit") at Attachment p. 1 (Information Sheet) (Feb. 28, 1997). 
92. See RWQCB Central Valley Region, Notice of Violation, Port of Stockton's 
Compliance With the State of California's General Permit for Stormwater Discharges 
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In the case of the Port of Stockton, staff at the Regional Wa-
ter Quality Control Board for the Central Valley Region had 
been investigating the lack of storm water controls at the facil-
ity for a number of years. On April 10, 1996, staff issued a no-
tice of violation to the Port documenting the results of that 'in-
vestigation, including numerous violations of the federal and 
state Clean Water laws. BayKeeper's Stockton-based project, 
DeltaKeeper, immediately opened a dialogue with Regional 
Board staff to understand what enforcement follow-up to the 
notice was expected. Staffs position was that the notice itself 
was sufficient to compel the Port to comply with the identified 
violations.93 
a. Leading the Agency Agenda - A Petition For Enforcement 
In 1996, DeltaKeeper wrote a letter to the Regional Board 
staff, urging staff to recommend to the Regional Board the is-
suance of an administrative penalty against the Port for the 
noticed violations. Staff indicated that they were not prepared 
to do so, preferring to utilize their limited resources to prepare 
an individual discharge permit addressing the Port's various 
discharges, including the storm water discharges as well as 
discharges associated with the bulk loading operations. Del-
taKeeper welcomed the opportunity to participate in the proc-
ess for issuing that discharge permit. 
When staff informed BayKeeper that they did not intend to 
recommend a penalty, DeltaKeeper asked whether staff would 
forward a petition from DeltaKeeper to the Board requesting 
that the Board issue an administrative penalty to the Port. 
Associated With Industrial Activities General permit), WDID No. 5B39200097, San 
Joaquin County ("Port NOV") (April 10, 1996). See also letter to Theodore A. Cobb, 
State Water Resources Control Board, from Nancee M. Murray, Department of Fish & 
Game (May 23, 1997). 
93. Anticipating an enforcement oriented strategy to address the Port of 
Stockton's violations, DeltaKeeper also became involved in a permit being issued 
around the time of the violation notice for the Port of Sacramento, another bulk loading 
port facility in the Delta. The Sacramento permit process allowed DeltaKeeper to 
address less serious but similar storm water concerns at another bulk materials facility 
in a less confrontational process, ultimately deferring to the Regional Board's permit-
ting decision and establishing informal contacts with the Port to review their progress 
towards to compliance. 
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Staff agreed to do so. DeltaKeeper prepared a petition re-
questing the Regional Board to follow through on stafl's notice 
of violations not only with the anticipated individual discharge 
permit but also with an administrative penalty of $450,000.94 
The petition included an evaluation of the criteria for assessing 
penalties provided under California's Porter-Cologne Water 
Quality Act, which are almost identical to those identified in 
the federal statute. 
After reviewing the petition, staff once again informed Del-
taKeeper that they would not recommend at that time that the 
Board issue a penalty against the Port.95 Moreover, instead of 
ordering compliance and assessing a penalty, the Regional 
Board's first reaction to its own notice of violation was to grant 
the Port a three year extension to come into compliance despite 
the years of obfuscation.96 Having anticipated this position 
from prior conversations, DeltaKeeper had prepared a notice of 
intent to sue letter including the violations addressed in the 
notice of violation and including several additional categories 
not addressed in that notice.97 While the petition to the Board 
was pending, DeltaKeeper served the notice of intent to sue on 
the Port. The purpose was at least three-fold. First, the notice 
preserved DeltaKeeper's discretion to go ahead with a citizen 
suit to pursue penalties and compliance measures should the 
Regional Board not assess any, or assess a modest amount of 
penalties, and should the anticipated permit not fully address 
all of the compliance issues.98 Second, the notice served to en-
94. See Port of Stockton Sails Out from Under Pollution Cloud, STOCKTON 
RECORD, Sept. 15, 1996. 
95. See Port Facing Water Fines, STOCKTON RECORD, Oct. 26, 1996, at AI. 
96. See Port Given Extension on Cleanup, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 10, 1996, at Bl. 
97. See letter to Alexander Krygsman, Port of Stockton, from Bill Jennings, Del-
taKeeper, and Michael R. Lozeau, San Francisco BayKeeper (October 2, 1996) ("Notice 
of Violations and Intent to File Suit Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act"). 
See also letter to Alexander Krygsman, Port of Stockton, from Bill Jennings, Del-
taKeeper, and Michael R. Lozeau, San Francisco BayKeeper (November 7, 1996) 
("Supplemental Notice of Violations and Intent to File Suit Under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act"); letter to Alexander Krygsman, Port of Stockton, from Bill 
Jennings, DeltaKeeper, and Michael R. Lozeau, San Francisco BayKeeper (June 2, 
1997) (noticing further additional violations). 
98. See Port May Be Sued, Lom NEWS SENTINEL, Oct. 8, 1996, at 1. 
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courage the Board and staff to take the petition seriously.99 
Thirdly, the notice placed the Port in an awkward position, 
having to address their violations on two fronts, thereby en-
couraging them to consider settling the penalty and permitting 
issues. 
Instead of bringing the Port to the settlement table, the no-
tice drove the Port to attempt to create some defenses to the 
claims which it otherwise did not have, including attempting to 
cease its discharges of storm water into the San Joaquin River. 
The Port began sealing its storm drains and pumping its storm 
water to an unused area of the facility that purportedly would 
contain the discharge.1oo Unfortunately, the Port's efforts were 
not aimed at preventing pollution sources, but rather were 
aimed at trying to frustrate DeltaKeeper's ability to maintain a 
dtizen suit by creating a claim that they were no longer dis-
charging to the river and had fully cured their long-standing 
noncompliance. 101 
Subsequent to DeltaKeeper's notice, staff still did not sup-
port the recommended penalties. However, staff did place the 
petition on the agenda for the Regional Board's October, 1996, 
meeting. Prior to the October, 1996, hearing on the penalty 
petition, staff articulated its disagreement with DeltaKeeper's 
position in a staff memorandum. At the meeting, the Regional 
Board opted not to follow staffs recommendation and instead 
instructed staff to prepare an administrative civil complaint 
recommending an appropriate penalty. While waiting for a 
99. See Activists Say Stockton Port is Polluted, ANTIOCH DAILY LEDGER-POST, Oct. 
3, 1996; State May Slap Port of Stockton with $260,000 Fine, STOCKTON RECORD, Jan. 
22, 1997, at AI; Port Penalty Pushed, STOCKTON RECORD, July 12, 1996. 
100. See Delta Watchdogs Bite in Stockton, ANTIOCH DAILY LEDGER-POST DIS-
PATCH, Dec. 15, 1996. 
101. Of course, it was almost impossible for a 600 acre facility to stop discharging 
storm water. The net effect was to flood many of its tenants and roadways. Moreover, 
during this time, a DeltaKeeper sample of deposits in the Port's storm channels was 
analyzed and found to contain hazardous levels of copper. That data comported with 
previous data analyzed by the California Department of Fish & Game showing similar 
levels in another portion of the storm drain system. This helped bolster DeltaKeeper's 
claim that the Port's new discharge to land was in violation of the Water Code's prohi-
bition on such discharges without the filing of a report of discharge accompanied with 
appropriate characterization data. As it turned out, the land discharge did not in fact 
prohibit all surface discharges. 
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revised staff recommendation, on December 11, 1996, Del-
taKeeper filed a citizen enforcement suit against the Port.102 
DeltaKeeper had thus succeeded in formalizing a two track en-
forcement process. As will be discussed below, when those two 
tracks were coupled with the media around the process, the 
Port was up against a number of tiers which it was unlikely to 
overcome and avoid paying a penalty and significantly up-
grading its effort to comply with the storm water requirements. 
In January, 1997, staff issued a proposed ACL complaint 
recommending to the Board that a penalty of $260,000 be as-
sessed against the Port.103 The Port took a very confronta-
tional response to the proposed penalty, arguing for no penalty. 
DeltaKeeper submitted comments reflecting the Port's refusal 
to cooperate, the discovery of hazardous levels of copper in the 
storm drain, and the Port's less than admirable efforts to solve 
the problem by arguing for an administrative penalty of $2.12 
million.104 Pursuant to the Regional Board's hearing rules, a 
full evidentiary hearing was held, allowing the Port to present 
evidence for ninety minutes.105 The only individual who ap-
peared at the hearing who proposed to the Board that they at 
least double the proposed penalty was DeltaKeeper's Bill 
Jennings. Much to everyone's surprise, the Board almost did 
just that - assessing a penalty of $500,000 but allowing the 
Port to credit itself for expenditures on storm water compliance 
up to $175,000.106 
DeltaKeeper's petition and the Regional Board's subsequent 
penalty is probably one of the first, if not the only time, in the 
102. See BayKeeper v. Port of Stockton, Complaint, Dec. 11, 1996. See also Envi-
ronmentalists Sue Port of Stockton: Toxies, TRI-VALLEYHERALD, Dec. 12, 1996. 
103. See In re Port of Stockton, Complaint No. 97-041; State May Slap Port of 
Stockton with $260,000 Fine, STOCKTON RECORD, Jan. 22, 1997, at Al. 
104. See letter to James R. Bennett, RWQCB, from Bill Jennings, DeltaKeeper, and 
Michael R. Lozeau, San Francisco BayKeeper (Feb. 24, 1997). 
105. See memorandum to Theodore A Cobb, SWRCB, from Gary Carlton, Executive 
Officer, RWQCB Central Valley Region (June 26, 1997) [hereinafter "Carlton Memo") 
(responding to Port of Stockton's appeal of the administrative penalty). 
106. See Carlton Memo at 4-5. See also Water Board Boosts Port's Pollution Fine, 
STOCKTON RECORD, March 1, 1997, at AI; Port of Stockton is Fined $500,000, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, March 1, 1997; Port of Stockton Fined $500,000, LaD! NEWS-
SENTINEL, March 1, 1997. 
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history of the State's Clean Water program that a citizens' 
group initiated an administrative enforcement process before 
the Board that resulted in an actual penalty. The Port, of 
course, was stunned at this turn of events and immediately 
filed an appeal, which staff successfully defended and which 
was dismissed without a hearing by the State Water Resources 
Control Board in August, 1997.107 
b. An Independent Citizen Enforcement Action 
In addition to the State's administrative process, Del-
taKeeper continued to pursue its own citizen suit. The inde-
pendent citizen action was necessary in order to assure prompt 
compliance by the Port with both its new permit and certain 
requirements predating the new permit. The citizen suit also 
provided DeltaKeeper an avenue to pursue the additional pen-
alties which it believed were appropriate. Also, the action 
served as an important safeguard in the unlikely event that the 
Port succeeded in overturning the State's administrative pen-
alty through its appeal. Backed up by the findings of violation 
found by the Regional Board staff in its April, 1996, notice of 
violations, as well as regular surveillance and monitoring by 
DeltaKeeper staff documenting the Port's lack of attention to 
its storm water pollution control efforts, the case was strong on 
the facts. In terms of the potential penalty, DeltaKeeper ad-
justed its position to acknowledge the Regional Board's penalty 
by a willingness to credit the Port the amount assessed towards 
the penalty DeltaKeeper thought appropriate if the Port was 
willing to withdraw its appeal and lock in the Board's penalty. 
Consistent with its response to each of the other proceed-
ings, the Port opted to fight DeltaKeeper on this front. Again, 
its aggressive strategy proved ineffective. In March, 1997, the 
Port filed a motion to dismiss DeltaKeeper's action. The mo-
tion included three arguments, requesting dismissal based on 
principals of abstention, the primary jurisdiction of the state 
107. DeltaKeeper submitted comments requesting the Board to dismiss the appeal 
for want of a significant issue. See letter to Theodore A. Cobb, SWRCB, from Bill 
Jennings, DeltaKeeper, and Michael R. Lozeau, San Francisco BayKeeper (June 26, 
1997). See also, Port to Appeal Fine, STOCKTON RECORD, April 3, 1997. 
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agencies, and mootness. On April 24, 1997, the district court 
rejected the Port's motion, allowing DeltaKeeper to pursue its 
claims. lOB Subsequent to that decision, both DeltaKeeper and 
the Port requested the Court to conduct a settlement meeting 
with the parties.109 This strategy seemed prudent given the 
thoroughness and style of the presiding judge, Judge Lawrence 
Karlton, the Chief Judge Emeritus for the Central District of 
California. 
This decision proved to be very effective, allowing the par-
ties to read very clearly the judge's view of the case and allow-
ing the parties to reach a relatively quick settlement. In short, 
the settlement provided for heightened compliance as well as 
additional payments towards mitigation projects to complete 
the penalty picture. Given the size of the six hundred-acre fa-
cility and the number of potential pollution sources and con-
duits, the compliance measures featured an aggressive audit . 
process, including oversight by DeltaKeeper's technical con-
sultants. In addition, the Port agreed to additional monitoring, 
additional oversight of its tenants, and the creation of an Envi-
ronmental Management position. As for the penalty issue, the 
Port agreed to pay $150,000 towards projects to benefit the 
health of the San Joaquin River and the Stockton Deep Water 
Channel. 110 
c. The Role of the Media 
Another important piece of the Port case study was the role 
played by the media. The Delta is an area of California 
marked by keen interest by the local public in their local wa-
ters. In contrast, the Delta is marked by a significant absence 
of regionally-based environmental groups focusing on day-to-
lOB. See San Francisco BayKeeper, et al. v. The Port of Stockton, Civ. S-96-2137 
LKKlPAN, Order denying motion to dismiss (Apr. 24, 1997) (unpublished). 
109. See San Francisco BayKeeper, et al. v. Port of Stockton, et aI., Civ. S-96-2137 
LKKlPAN, Amended Status Order setting Settlement Conference (May 27, 1997). 
110. The $150,000 payment went towards several projects, including a $70,000 
grant for a study of fish tissue contamination in the Delta to be conducted by the San 
Francisco Estuary Institute, a $40,000 grant to the University of California at Davis 
for toxicity monitoring in the Delta, and a grant to the Lincoln Unified School District 
for students to conduct in-stream bioassays in the Stockton area. 
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day issues affecting the health of those waters.1ll DeltaKeeper 
has successfully filled that void. As a result, there has been a 
significant interest by local media outlets in DeltaKeeper's pro-
gram. ll2 This interest was accentuated in the case of the Port. 
The largest local daily, The Stockton Record, reported on the 
Port's storm water problem from the very beginning, when it 
documented inaction by the Department of Fish and Game to 
muster an enforcement response to documented toxicity from 
the site. ll3 Each step of the various proceedings was covered 
by the Stockton Record, including the notice of violation, Del-
taKeeper's petition, DeltaKeeper's filing of the lawsuit, the 
Board's request that staff prepare a recommended ACL, staff's 
proposed ACL, the Board's decision to assess a fine, the Court's 
dismissal of the Port's motion to dismiss, the Port's appeal of 
the fine, and the State Board's dismissal of that appeal. Each 
article educated the Stockton public about both the Port's is-
sues as well as the critical role played by DeltaKeeper in as-
sisting in herding that process towards a strong result. 
Most notable was the Port's effort to take control of the 
negative press it was receiving by purchasing a double page 
advertisement in the Stockton Record the same day that a story 
by one of the paper's business reporters appeared regarding the 
decline of the Port's profits.114 The Port's ad attempted to look 
like actual articles in the Stockton Record and featured head-
lines such as "Port Attacked Instead of Commended. "115 The 
ad featured a photograph of an employee drinking the Port's 
storm water runoff.116 In general, the ad sought to paint the 
111. A local news article noted that DeltaKeeper's Bill Jennings "is perhaps 
Stockton's lone professional environmentalist." Up a Different Creek: Environmentalist 
Turns Attention to Calaveras River, STOCKTON RECORD, Sept. 11, 1995, at AI. See also, 
Rolling Down Delta's Rivers, Sniffing for Polluters, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Jan. 8,1996. 
112. Since initiating its work on the Port of Stockton pollution issues, the issue as 
well as DeltaKeeper's involvement have been the subject of over 30 newspaper articles 
at this time. In addition, several of the decision points were covered extensively by 
local television and radio. 
113. See Port of Stockton Sails Out from Under Pollution Cloud, STOCKTON 
RECORD, Sept. 15, 1996, at AI. 
114. See STOCKTON RECORD, Feb. 16, 1997. 
115. [d. 
116. See id. 
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Regional Board, the Department of Fish and Game, and Del-
taKeeper as agencies run amok. 
The ad proved more effective for DeltaKeeper than for the 
Port. First, the ad raised the importance of DeltaKeeper as 
comparable to that of the agencies, a notable feat given Del-
taKeeper's staff of two and, at the time, less than one year of 
actual operations. Second, the ad was not credible because it 
demonstrated that two agencies and DeltaKeeper agreed that 
the Port had a problem, yet claimed somehow they all were 
wrong and the Port - purchaser of the ad - was right. This 
impression was highlighted by the Port's resorting to an ad 
which sought to trick people into thinking it was editorial text 
of the paper. 
Third, and most importantly, the ad brought readers to the 
defense of DeltaKeeper, not the Port. This result was assisted 
by a rather caustic quote attributed to the Port's Director and 
included in an actual article calling DeltaKeeper's action "ex-
tortion." The reporter failed to ask DeltaKeeper for any re-
sponse to that quote. As a result, the paper published a full 
rebuttal by DeltaKeeper in its editorial section the following 
Sunday. 117 Five letters to the editor subsequently were pub-
lished in support of DeltaKeeper.118 Only one letter was pub-
lished in support of the Port.119 The paper then tried to add its 
own editorial spin, and in doing so stated that DeltaKeeper 
would benefit financially from its case.120 To finish off Del-
taKeeper's media coup, the paper was compelled to publish an 
117. See Bill Jennings, Editorial, Port of Stockton Has No Immunity from the Rules, 
STOCKTON RECORD, March 1, 1997. See also, Port of Stockton in Troubled Waters -
Pollution Levels Poisoning Reputation, March 9, 1997, at Al (featuring a 3-column-
wide photo of Bill Jennings at Port's storm water channel). 
118. See J.D. Withers, Letter to the Editor, Questioning Port of Stockton, STOCKTON 
RECORD, March 15, 1997; Bruce Giudici, Letter to the Editor, DeltaKeeper Solution 
Oriented, STOCKTON RECORD, March 20, 1997; Bill Ferrero, Letter to the Editor, 
Watchdog Groups Deserve Thanks, STOCKTON RECORD, Apr. 3, 1997. 
119. See Rod Barklow, Letter to the Editor, Questioning Port of Stockton, 
STOCKTON RECORD, Mar. 15, 1997. 
120. See Editorial, Port Water Pollution: Solve Problem Now, STOCKTON RECORD, 
Mar. 12, 1997. 
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opinion piece by DeltaKeeper to correct that careless editorial 
comment.121 
Add in interest by other major papers in the region and sub-
stantial coverage by local television news, radio and other out-
lets and it is without a doubt that DeltaKeeper had the clear 
advantage in the media play. This almost certainly played a 
significant role in the willingness of the Port to come to the ta-
ble. 
The case against the Port represents a case in which the 
scope of the Clean Water Act's enforcement provisions works 
well. The Port's annual profits are in the range of $10 million, 
what might be referred to as a medium sized discharger. For 
that sized discharger, daily maximum penalties of $25,000 per 
day per violation are significant, but the federal court process 
is not so expensive as to prevent them from taking stock of 
their situation through some motion practice and discovery. 
Coupled with some thoughtful agency and media strategies, 
even a modest sized group like BayKeeper's DeltaKeeper office 
can successfully take on a very large player like the Port with 
little difficulty. It is this type of case for which the Act is well-
designed. 
3. The Unocal Case 
The third case study does not involve a storm water case. I 
nevertheless include it here to make two points. First, it ex-
emplifies a scenario where the discharger's large economic size 
and physical size involves such large economies of scales that it 
can afford to drag out an enforcement action as long as the pro-
cess will allow. Given the general hesitancy shown by judges 
thus far to assess penalties at the maximum levels authorized 
by Congress and the huge costs of compliance avoided by the 
company for a period of years, such a strategy is unfortunately 
predictable. Second, this case study exemplifies another area 
of pollution previously unrecognized by the Act's regulators but 
yet addresses it by applying numeric, end-of-pipe eflluent lim-
121. See Editorial, DeltaKeeper Takes Exceptwn, STOCKTON RECORD, Apr. 2, 1997, 
at AI0 (DeltaKeeper's rebuttal). 
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its. Thus, this case makes for an interesting transition case, 
demonstrating the evolution of both the Act and citizen suits 
enforcing the Act. 
Union Oil Company ("Unocal") is one of three oil refineries 
in the Bay Area identified as the primary sources of selenium 
to San Francisco Bay.122 The whole northern sweep of San 
Francisco Bay has been identified by EPA and the Regional 
Board as impaired by selenium, a very powerful teratogen. In 
order to address this concern, the Regional Board issued per-
mits in 1990 along with interim effluent limits to the refmeries 
which ordered the companies to reduce the concentration of 
selenium in their wastewater to fifty ug/l by not later than De-
cember 12, 1993.123 This was the first time that selenium was 
recognized as a pollutant contributed by refineries and accord-
ingly regulated under the Clean Water Act.124 
Instead of accepting the new limits, the companies chose to 
challenge the permits, losing before the State Board and filing 
an appeal to the Solano County Superior Court.125 That case 
was placed on a slow track until negotiations began with the 
agency in the fall of 1993.126 In the meantime, the company 
did not meet the December 12, 1993 deadline.127 Indeed, the 
quantity of selenium discharged by Unocal during that period 
actually went up. When the company's certain noncompliance 
became apparent to Regional Board staff and they began dis-
cussing potential enforcement against the company, the com-
122. The other main source of selenium to the Bay is from agricultural runoff oc-
curring in the Central Valley of California. See TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 4. 
123. See RWQCB San Francisco Bay Region, Order No. 91-026 (Feb. 20, 1991). See 
also Communities for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th 
Cir.1996). 
124. See RWQCB San Francisco Bay Region, Order No. 94-015, 'I 8 (Jan. 19, 1994). 
See also TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 6-7. 
125. See TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 8. See Western States Petroleum Ass'n v. Cali-
fornia Regional Water Quality Control Board, No. 121078 (County of Solano Superior 
Court) (med October 16, 1992). 
126. See TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 8; RWQCB San Francisco Bay Region, Resolu-
tion No. 94-016 (Jan. 19, 1994); Western States Petroleum Ass'n v. California Regional 
Water Quality Control Board, No. 121078 (County of Solano Superior Court), Stipula-
tion for Settlement and Dismissal of Action (entered into by RWQCB on Jan. 20, 
1994). 
127. See Communities for a Better Environment, 83 F.3d at 1114. 
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pany's attorneys were ready with the leverage provided by 
their still pending permit appeal to forestall a vigorous en-
forcement action by the Board. Instead, they convinced the 
Board to extend the timeline for complying by five years in ex-
change for the company committing $780,000 to the Board to 
assist staff in understanding the selenium issues and dismiss-
ing its permit challenge. However, because the company did 
not want to suffer the stigma of a real penalty, the payments 
were included in a settlement agreement rather than an en-
forcement order. In order to give the Board's action some ve-
neer of enforcement, the extension of the compliance timeline 
was not placed in the permit, but rather in a cease and desist 
order. 
A number of environmental groups, led by Communities For 
ABetter Environment ("CBE") and BayKeeper, were aware of 
Unocal's compliance problem as well as the deal in the making. 
Fearful that the Regional Board's position had been compro-
mised by the permit appeal and perhaps staffs concern with 
dealing with a previously underrecognized pollution problem, 
CBE, BayKeeper, a coalition of three other environmental or-
ganizations, and two individual anglers, sent a notice of intent 
to sue to the company, citing its imminent violations of its se-
lenium limit. Coupled with that notice, BayKeeper and CBE 
launched a strategic effort to assure that the Board's proposed 
"enforcement" action was identified for what it was, an exten-
sion of time rather than enforcement, without any real penalty 
or other punishment to the company. This effort had a number 
of rationales behind it. First, it is what the groups believed the 
proposed deal represented. Second, the groups' attorneys un-
derstood well the implications of the Clean Water Act's citizen 
suit preclusion provisions which only applied to administrative 
enforcement actions that assessed a penalty against a viola-
tor.128 
In fact, the groups' enforcement action not only began with 
the notice letter, but also, to a large extent, it began, and at 
least one argument was won, during the administrative process 
128. See Clean Water Act § 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (1988). 
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seeking to approve the Board staff's recommended settlement 
with Unocal. In response to questions by BayKeeper and CBE, 
both staff and Unocal attorneys admitted during that proceed-
ing that the $780,000 payment to the Board was not a penalty. 
Similarly, staff and the companies also made clear that the 
compliance extension was not a change to the existing permit 
but rather was an enforcement decision of the Board. These 
statements guided the district court through two of Unocal's 
key arguments made in defense of the groups' subsequently 
filed citizen suit. 
In many ways, the Unocal case marked a turning point in 
the relationship between citizen enforcement groups in the Bay 
Area, especially BayKeeper, and the Regional Board. The Uno-
cal case probably marks one of the last times where BayKeeper 
criticized the agency along with the violator for its failure to 
hold the company to its permit requirements. That dual criti-
cism resulted first from the agency's failure to include the in-
terested groups in the negotiations leading up to the settlement 
which presumed to decide not the selenium effluent limit issue, 
but rather the compliance issue. That proposed result was per-
ceived to infringe on matters outside of the permit appeal, i.e. 
enforcement of the terms, and did not represent an aggressive 
defense of the validity of the original permit terms. Instead, it 
was a decision that appeared to be more informed by the 
agency's resource limitations, not the validity of the permit. 
Once it had gone down that path, the Regional Board further 
put itself on the defensive when it began to promote, and ulti-
mately defend, the proposed settlement. In defending the set-
tlement, the Board was in the position of defending the oil 
companies, again, not because they were right, but because the 
agency was nervous about the resources necessary to defend its 
prior decision. 
As the criticism of the agency, as well as Unocal, grew, and 
the environmental groups began to rack up victories in the case 
despite the agency's position, the agency was placed in a posi-
tion where the settlement result was not only effectively ques-
tioned, but continuously belittled as adequate enforcement by 
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two federal court decisions.129 In terms of an apparent transi-
tion, that negative effect of the citizen suit on the Board's pre-
ferred process likely was taken to heart and future proposed 
actions have been noticeable for their inclusion of the inter-
ested groups. 
At the same time that the citizens' enforcement case inher-
ently criticized the agency's settlement decision, the two tiers 
of action represented by the agency's order and the groups' en-
forcement case also presented a rather unique two-fold strategy 
to bring Unocal into compliance with a new effluent limit. 
Prior to filing their enforcement case, the groups recognized the 
value of having the agency and, in this case even the dis-
charger, say the right things prior to initiation of a case. As 
Unocal's legal strategy resulted in delays in the enforcement 
case, the groups also recognized the value of the perhaps less 
aggressive but nevertheless substantive process that the Re-
gional Board's agreement with the company had established, 
including both important technical information which other-
wise may not have been produced and a clear fallback timeline 
to the extent the company succeeded in delaying the litigation 
out a number of years. 
In the case of the pre-filing record, the groups' efforts before 
the Board during its consideration of the proposed settlement 
brought an element common to cases bringing challenges of 
administrative decisions, e.g. developing the administrative 
record prior to bringing a challenge under the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act ("NEPA"). This was a step largely unfa-
miliar to the way citizen suits had been brought prior to that 
time. Previously, citizen suits involved a relatively simple dis-
cussion of whether discharges were over the applicable effluent 
limits in a permit. The effort in the Unocal case to broaden the 
underlying evidence in a case was necessitated by the relative 
novelty of selenium being regulated by a discharge permit and 
the correlating hesitancy of the agency to move too aggres-
sively, despite the pollutant's poisonous nature and EPA's 
129. See Communities for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co., 861 F. Supp. 889 
(N.D. Cal 1994); Communities for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111 
(9th Cir. 1996). 
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finding of impairment. It also was required by the presence of 
Section 309(g) of the Act, the citizen suit preclusion provisions 
added by Congress in 1987. Few if any citizen suits had been 
constrained by both of those contexts prior to the time of the 
Unocal case. Not only did the environmental groups recognize 
at the time the need for careful maneuvers to position them-
selves in a way that would allow them to play their role as citi-
zen enforcers, certainly one of the groups, BayKeeper, took 
many of the lessons to heart as it formulated its long term 
strategies to begin enforcing some of the new requirements 
then being introduced under the Act, especially the storm wa-
ter rules. 
Likewise, the utility of allowing the agency to decide its pre-
ferred course of action free of criticism, while possibly stating 
an alternative position and taking steps to prevent any willful 
disruption of citizen enforcement options where they are con-
templated, has become a common position for BayKeeper to 
take. The resulting agency process generally will be supportive 
of any enforcement action decided upon by the group and the 
fact that the group participated constructively in the process 
makes it more likely that the agency will include BayKeeper 
and others in that unfolding process. That interaction, again, 
would allow Bay Keeper even more opportunities to comment 
on key decisions relative to that parallel process, and perhaps 
convince the agency to mold that process in a way that better 
coordinates with any subsequent enforcement action. 
In addition to participating in processes, the need for a 
group to interact with staff in order to keep pace with the vari-
ous strategy levels contemplated above, encourages long-term 
relationships between that group and staff that, again, a strict 
citizen suit agenda would not encourage. Where, in the case of 
BayKeeper, the group's programmatic boundaries are limited 
to a particular watershed, albeit the rather huge watershed of 
San Francisco Bay, its Delta and other tributaries, those inter-
actions are reinforced even further. Over time, the steady pro-
fessional presence of BayKeeper on various levels of numerous 
pollution issues, presented in language constructive to staffs 
process, has resulted in a strong working relationship between 
the group's representatives and staff. It is unlikely that many, 
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if any dischargers, can match the presence of BayKeeper in and 
around the San Francisco Bay Regional Board. First, most 
could not afford to buy the personnel which BayKeeper's volun-
teer-based program can muster. Second, they cannot always be 
worrying about just one agency, attention to which comprises a 
large part of BayKeeper's agenda. Third, the dischargers 
whom BayKeeper is interested in are, in many cases, involved 
with compliance problems and, thus, not preemptively viewed 
by the Board as entirely objective of their situation. 
Over time, these efforts to focus on how to participate in the 
agency proceedings have led to situations where the agency 
takes a similar view to BayKeeper's proceedings. In part be-
cause of the constant reiteration, the agency has grown to re-
alize that even where BayKeeper chooses a more aggressive 
enforcement posture, rarely will the agency's compliance strat-
egy be undermined. Indeed, the uncertainty of the outcome of 
such citizen strategies is a powerful incentive for dischargers to 
do exactly what the Regional Board says. Were the agency to 
resort to a strategy where it seeks to "protect" dischargers from 
citizen actions, in the long run, it would lose that incentive 
which makes its job easier, even if it were only aiming at com-
pliance and not punishment. 
Thus, where there is a recognized pollution problem for 
which enforcement is a legitimate strategy, and the agency 
opts not to pursue such a strategy, for lack of sufficient re-
sources or for other reasons, it is more likely to make sure that 
BayKeeper not be disrupted should the group choose to pursue 
enforcement. Almost always, the Regional Board and 
BayKeeper are articulating the same compliance goal even 
where they differ on the best route to achieve that goal. How-
ever, where neither philosophy is so arrogant as to perceive its 
own agenda as being the only possibly correct one, allowing two 
agendas to act simultaneously will almost certainly achieve 
compliance as soon as is possible. 
Thus, the Unocal case provides an important example of the 
pros and cons resulting from the various types of interactions 
between the environmental groups and the Regional Board. 
The path followed by BayKeeper subsequent to that case has 
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revolved around an effort by BayKeeper to keep criticism fo-
cused squarely on the polluter rather than the agency. That 
effort has resulted in processes viewed by staff as more con-
structive and allows for greater effectiveness on the adminis-
trative level by BayKeeper. That effectiveness is caused by not 
only the more constructive relationship, but also BayKeeper's 
constant presence within the agency's proceedings, a percep-
tion by both BayKeeper and the Board that their agendas are 
complimentary, not competitive, and a realization that two 
strategies are better than one when trying to assure the 
achievement of a specific result. As noted above, the evolution 
of these multi-tiered strategies is reinforced by the storm water 
program, involving thousands of dischargers and limited 
agency resources. 
Despite the clarity of the administrative record and the lan-
guage of the Clean Water Act and the effectiveness of the envi-
ronmental groups in pursuing an enforcement action against 
the company, Unocal has been able to slow down the litigation 
process through aggressive yet unsuccessful appeals.130 This 
third case study exemplifies a situation where the magnitude 
of the company's operation is so vast that it dwarfs the fines 
authorized by the Clean Water Act. Instead of encouraging 
voluntary compliance, an operation as large as Unocal's is en-
couraged to first wait until someone discovers the violation 
and, second, delay any order to comply as long as possible. As 
mentioned above, judges have been hesitant to assess maxi-
mum fines. Where compliance may run into the tens of mil-
lions of dollars, legal fees may be half a million per year at the 
worst, and the likely penalty may be a few million dollars, it 
makes sense for the company to do as little as possible and fo-
cus on prolonging the litigation in order to avoid the heaviest 
costs as long as possible. These are the instances where either 
judges must take the maximum penalties already provided by 
statute more seriously, or Congress must authorize greater 
penalty maximums in order to encourage voluntary compliance 
130. Indeed, during 1997, Unocal completed the sale of its Rodeo refmery to Tosco 
Corporation. Tosco has now been added to the case, along with Unocal. As of the date 
of completion of this article, settlement conversations with the two companies were 
well underway. 
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rather than deferring compliance in exchange for less costly 
litigation or leveraging the Regional Board's relative lack of 
resources to defend itself against every lawsuit a refmery may 
wish to pursue. 
VII. FINE TUNING THE CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT 
PROVISIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
Bay Keeper's program is likely one of the more sophisticated 
citizen enforcement programs in the country. The three case 
studies described above demonstrate a need to make the Act's 
citizen enforcement proceedings more flexible in order to better 
adjust to the range of violators that are encountered. This is 
most apparent at the edges of the range of violators - the 
smallest and the largest. Although the strategies of groups like 
BayKeeper have adjusted to the new types of pollution being 
addressed by the Act as well as court interpretations of the 
citizen suit provisions, there is only so far that they can go 
without some guidance from the statute. Moreover, the effec-
tiveness of BayKeeper's ability to work constructively with its 
local agencies to assure the most effective enforcement for the 
Bay and Delta regions may be limited to California's regulatory 
structure. The following recommendations would allow such 
innovations to become available to citizen groups throughout 
the country. 
A. MAxIMUM CIVIL PENALTIES UNDER THE ACT SHOULD BE 
RAISED TO $50,000 PER DAY PER VIOLATION AND MINIMUM 
CIVIL PENALTIES ALso SHOULD BE PRESCRIBED 
As exemplified by Unocal's reaction to CBE's and 
BayKeeper's citizen suit, when dealing with violators involving 
very large facilities, like a refinery, the penalties and fee shift-
ing provisions provided by the federal Clean Water Act for citi-
zen enforcement actions do not provide adequate deterrents for 
dischargers to insure compliance. The Act should allow a 
higher range of penalties for a citizen to seek to have assessed 
in order to assure that the largest companies take the enforce-
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ment process seriously. The maximum penalty should be set at 
$50,000 per day per violation.131 This will eliminate the disin-
centive to comply built into the current process for the largest 
companies. The additional potential penalties will assure that 
the courts have enough leeway to make sure that any penalty 
involving some of the largest dischargers will disgorge all ill-
gotten profits. Moreover, raising the maximum penalty would 
provide federal judges with more incentive to understand the 
degree of severity with which Congress intended the courts to 
mete out punishment. 
B. THE ACT SHOULD PROVIDE AN AVENUE FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
As to smaller violators, the Act 'should include a parallel 
citizen enforcement action that proceeds in front of an adminis-
trative agency. In California, this could be established through 
the Regional Water Quality Control Boards. Another option 
would be an enforcement hearing board established at EPA's 
regional offices. In any event, an administrative enforcement 
process would (1) have much lower transaction costs than a 
federal lawsuit, (2) not require either the citizen enforcer or the 
violator to retain an attorney to represent them, and (3) pre-
sumably involve agency officials who already are more familiar 
with the local water bodies and the technical issues that may 
arise with regard to appropriate remedies. Such an adminis-
trative enforcement process should include provisions to assure 
that any penalties assessed be used to defray the agency's costs 
of maintaining the enforcement process. Other than the adju-
dicatory body, however, the main elements of the existing citi-
zen suit provision should be maintained, including a citizen's 
ability to seek injunctive relief, civil penalties and recovery of 
their costs, including reasonable attorney and expert fees. 
131. A number of states already have established a maximum penalty of $50,000. 
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C. SAN FRANCISCO'S CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ORDINANCE: A 
WATERSHED APPROACH TO CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT 
Consistent with those proposals to expand citizens' ability to 
apply their own discretion as to how best to address a water 
pollution violation, and not be forced to exercise an enforce-
ment role through federal court, in the spring of 1997, 
BayKeeper proposed a citizen enforcement provision for the 
City and County of San Francisco. On March 17, 1997, the San 
Francisco Board of Supervisors passed BayKeeper's Citizen 
Enforcement Ordinance.132 The ordinance was introduced by 
Supervisor Sue Bierman and passed with a unanimous vote. 
Mayor Willie Brown signed the ordinance into law on March 
28, 1997.133 The citizen enforcement ordinance authorizes citi-
zens to enforce the City and County of San Francisco's laws 
prohibiting and controlling discharges of pollutants into the 
City's sewer system. The ordinance also encourages City resi-
dents to detect violations of the City's laws which, for example, 
prohibit the dumping of hazardous waste into the City's com-
bined sewer/storm water system. 
San Francisco's ordinance is interesting for a number of 
reasons. First, in addition to encouraging independent citizen 
enforcement, it also creates a reward system that encourages 
local citizens to report violations to the City's enforcement 
agency. This two-tiered citizen enforcement ordinance, thus, 
reflects the two-tiered strategies which BayKeeper has been 
working on for a number of years. Unlike the federal citizen 
suit provision, which, coupled with judicial decisions like 
Gwaltney, has served to drive the agencies and citizen enforc-
ers apart in many instances, the San Francisco ordinance in-
stead promotes them as allies, as they should be. The ordi-
nance encourages the agency to do its enforcement work while 
at the same time making sure citizens are rewarded for as-
sisting them. But, critically, the ordinance provides for inde-
pendent enforcement authority for the investigating citizen 
should the agency opt not to follow through. 
132. Ord. No. 115-97, SAN FRANCISCO MUNI. PuB. WORKS CODE § 139 (1998). 
133. See id. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Clean Water Act has come a long way since its birth on 
October 18, 1972. During that time, the Act has evolved 
through amendments, through regulations, and through judi-
cial interpretations. At the same time, citizen enforcement has 
co-evolved, responding to the political ebbs and flows of the ex-
ecutive branch as well as the development of the law itself. 
After over twenty-five years, ample evidence now exists con-
firming the wisdom of Congress in authorizing citizens to play 
a key role in the Act's enforcement scheme. When government 
enforcement dropped off in the early 1980's, citizen enforcers 
stepped in. When the Act's pollution targets expanded to in-
clude a multitude of storm water pollution sources, citizen en-
forcers have stepped up to kick start the massive enforcement 
agenda which the storm water rules trigger. Time and time 
again, citizen enforcers have successfully brought cases or used 
the potential of a case to resolve important water pollution 
problems around the country. Over time, the citizen enforce-
ment banner has been passed on from the ground breaking 
work of national groups like NRDC to more regional strategies, 
either driven by iocal watershed-based groups or by national 
groups working on regional agendas. 
That evolution needs to continue. Further empowering citi-
zens to apply their own discretion will encourage more and 
more cooperation between those groups and their local agen-
cies, as well as the dischargers themselves. The more locally-
based a group's enforcement program is, the more likely it is 
that cooperative enforcement agendas with local agencies will 
be possible and as effective, or more effective, than if either the 
local agency or the citizens group chose to proceed alone. The 
above proposals appeal to citizen enforcement authority which 
trusts the judgment of both the citizen enforcers and the courts 
and agencies considering their case. Enforcement authority 
that brings the largest corporations down to earth and ac-
knowledges the burdens a federal court action may place on a 
small company, would provide an appropriate acknowledgment 
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of the past effectiveness of citizen enforcers and the expanding 
role they will continue to playas the Act continues to evolve.l34 
134. I am thinking of various legislative proposals which would, among things, su-
persede the Supreme Court's Gwaltney decision limiting citizen suits to "ongoing" vio-
lations of the Act or assure that the notice of intent to sue requirements do not exceed 
the rules of pleading generally. 
60
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss3/7
